









Are Active Norwegian Mutual Fund 
Managers Paid for Luck or Skill? 
A New Approach to Distinguish Between Luck and Skill 
Among Active Norwegian Mutual Fund Managers 
KRISTIAN FJÆRBU LØHAUGEN VIKSTØL 
SUPERVISOR 
Valeriy Ivanovich Zakamulin 
University of Agder, 2021 
School of Business and Law 
Department of Economics and Finance 
 
Abstract
This thesis investigates whether the performance of actively managed Norwegian mutual
funds is due to luck or skill. First, we measure the performance on aggregate and individual
levels using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. We then turn to the bootstrapping
procedures, free from data snooping bias, proposed by Kosowski, Timmermann, White, and
Wermers (2006), Fama and French (2010), and a new approach proposed by Harvey and Liu
(2020) in evaluation of luck or skill among the Norwegian mutual fund managers. Through
the data, free from survivorship bias, aggregate fund performance suggest no statistically
significant evidence of abnormal risk-adjusted net-of-fees return. At the individual level
we find both positive and negative statistically significant abnormal net-of-fees returns,
risk-adjusted. Finally, there is no statistically significant evidence of skill amongst the
Norwegian mutual fund managers. We do, however, find evidence of a lack of skill among
the bottom performing managers.
i
Preface
This master thesis concludes the studies in a master’s program of finance at the School of
Business and Law, UiA. The topic of this thesis was chosen due to my interests in financial
markets and specifically the Norwegian mutual fund market. Investments into the financial
markets made by private persons have been growing in Norway. From this, an opportunity
to investigate whether the actively managed funds can generate returns warranting their fees
is a motivation in itself. Also, there is an ongoing debate as to whether one should invest in
passive funds or actively managed funds. Attaining more knowledge, and investigating further
into the subject is thus of great interest to me.
During this thesis, I have faced both interesting and educational challenges. Including how
the Norwegian mutual fund market is organized, statistical methods to measure the perfor-
mance of funds, and getting an in-depth view of how mutual fund performance measurement
has evolved since the 1950s.
Choosing to write this thesis in English as opposed to my native language, Norwegian,
stems from the nature of the topic. Past research and expressions within the field and statistical
methods are easier to convey in a meaningful way in the English language. Through this, I
believe that I am able to communicate the methodology and past research in a more accurate
way than what would be the case if terms and methodologies had to be translated.
Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor Valeriy Ivanovich Zakamulin. He has brought
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1 Introduction
This thesis investigates whether Norwegian mutual fund managers are able to generate abnor-
mal returns for their customers, and whether abnormal performance is due to luck or skill.
Beating the “market” has long been seen as impossible. Yet, investors buy into actively man-
aged funds as opposed to passively managed index funds. As investors are paying a higher
price in actively managed mutual funds, one would expect a higher return to cover the higher
price paid.
Actively managed funds buy and sell stocks in their attempt to generate abnormal returns.
That is, they seek to buy stocks which they expect will have a price increase, and sell stock-
holdings that they expect will not contribute to abnormal returns. Passively managed index
funds, however, are low-cost funds, that try to mimic the return of a market index. The active
mutual funds measure themselves against benchmarks, which they aim to beat. Mutual funds
can have different benchmarks but they are often an index, which can be related to a broad
index, sector, or industry.
In order for active mutual funds to generate abnormal returns net of fees, the market
cannot be fully efficient as proposed by Fama (1970) in his Efficient Market hypothesis. More
specifically, if the active mutual fund managers are able to exploit information from political
changes, market trends, the economy as a whole, or other factors that could affect the pricing
of assets then the market is not fully efficient. From this, Fama argued that any abnormal
returns would solely be attributed to luck, as opposed to the stock-picking skill of a mutual
fund manager.
We thus have two questions to answer in this thesis: 1) Are Norwegian mutual fund man-
agers capable of generating abnormal returns net of fees, and 2) Are the Norwegian mutual
fund managers skillful enough to warrant their fees, or are they lucky?
To address these questions, and separating this thesis from the before-mentioned studies
on the Norwegian mutual fund market. A longer time period is selected for fund returns, in
addition to applying the new proposed bootstrapping approach of Harvey and Liu (2020). The
sample consists of 107 actively managed Norwegian mutual funds. Further, funds are required
to have a minimum of 12 monthly returns in the period extending between January 1987 and
December 2019.
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The first question of this thesis, more specifically, whether active Norwegian managers are
able to generate abnormal returns that are both risk-adjusted and net of fees. Calls for the
application of regression estimation using factor models. These models will be discussed in
later sections.
From a statistical point of view, we know that a large sample contains both positive and
negative abnormal performances, which may be solely due to luck. This is a critical problem in
multiple testing, where if you run a test enough times, you will find significant evidence. This
is a type of data-mining bias and warrants the application of a method in which can separate
skill from luck.
As an answer to the before-mentioned statistical problems in multiple testing, we can utilize
the methodology of bootstrapping. This will help us in distinguishing luck from skill, answering
the second question of this thesis. In order to separate luck from skill, one needs to test a
null hypothesis stating that all funds perform similarly to the benchmark. Specifically, that no
funds generate abnormal returns. This test relies on the application of bootstrapping, because
we have no other method available to conduct it. Further, we generate the distribution of
funds alpha under the null of no abnormal returns, or, equivalently, no skill. From this, we
infer whether the alpha generated by the funds is due to luck or skill. The approaches applied
are based on those of Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French (2010), and the approach which
has not previously been applied in Norwegian mutual fund performance measurement before,
Harvey and Liu (2020).
In addition, the new method proposed by Harvey and Liu (2020), makes use of a double
bootstrap approach, as opposed to a single round bootstrap in the frameworks of Kosowski
et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010). This method also takes into consideration the
Type I and Type II error rates of the test statistics applied to the original dataset. From
this, one can determine which cutoff test statistic to use. The test statistic should satisfy
one’s requirements in terms of Type I and Type II errors, in addition to the prior belief of
the number of outperforming funds. Furthermore, all these papers employ the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model, where alpha is the measure of abnormal return.
The U.S. mutual funds are the most frequently investigated mutual funds, for which the
majority of the literature and research is based. Studies concerning the Norwegian mutual
funds are few, especially those taking on a broad and extensive investigation as in this thesis.
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There is, however, a study on the Norwegian mutual fund market that applies the methodology
of Kosowski et al. (2006). This study was conducted by Gallefoss, Hansen, Haukaas, and
Molnár (2015). From their results, Gallefoss et al. (2015) claim that the performance of
top and bottom funds is attributable to stock-picking skill or a lack thereof, respectively.
Contradicting evidence to the findings of Gallefoss et al. (2015) in the Norwegian mutual fund
market is found in the study conducted by Sørensen (2009). In his paper, Sørensen applied
the methodology of Fama and French (2010) and did not find evidence of skilled Norwegian
mutual fund managers. Sørensen (2009) did, however, find evidence of unskilled managers in
his study, where the inferior returns of some managers could not be attributed to bad luck
alone.
Results of the net-return of Norwegian mutual funds indicate that on aggregate, they are
not able to generate statistically significant returns different from zero. As net-return of funds
are used, this evidence tells us that the managers are not skillful enough to go beyond covering
their costs. On the other side of the spectrum, findings tell us that the under-performers
indeed have inferior skill. That is, the returns provided by these funds cannot be attributed
to the fund managers having bad luck, but their lack of skill actually generates negative risk-
adjusted-performance.
Lastly, addressing test power, which tells us whether or not our analysis is viable. Findings
from Harvey and Liu (2020) suggest too low test power in the framework of Kosowski et al.
(2006) and Fama and French (2010). In addition, measuring the test power of the cutoff t-
statistics found through the Harvey and Liu (2020) methodology suggests too low test power
also in this approach. From this, we gather that the Norwegian mutual funds do generate
abnormal returns net of fees. We are, however, not able to determine whether this is due to
skill or luck, due to the power of the tests.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 comprises a literature review of
studies and academic papers. Next, models and methodology are presented in Section 3. The
data and its properties are detailed in Section 4, along with criteria and assumptions. Section
5 reviews the empirical results of applying the models and methodology to the data. Finally,
conclusions are shown in Section 6.
3
2 Literature Review
This section comprises a review of past studies on mutual fund performance, the luck and skill
in these performances, and bootstrapping, along with academic literature on the matter. The
main goal of the section is to introduce and brief readers to the most relevant and important
studies and papers related to the subject, and, in turn, establish expectations for the findings
of this thesis. To create a foundation for the understanding of performance evaluation, the
first part comprises historical literature essential to this topic. In the subsequent part, a review
of the literature and implementation relevant to the bootstrapping procedures measuring luck
versus skill will be presented.
2.1 Mutual Fund Performance
Markowitz (1952) introduced the topic of portfolio theory. His idea was that diversification
could reduce the risk of holding financial assets. The contribution of Markowitz’s papers to
the financial research field landed him the Nobel memorial prize in economic sciences in 1990,
along with William Sharpe and Merton Miller. Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin
(1966) created the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The introduction of CAPM serves
as a crucial piece in the field of Economic theory. The model is fundamental in the performance
measurement and has been developed to evaluate risk-adjusted returns for mutual funds. This
was done by Jensen (1968), where he created a single-factor model.
First, the Sharpe ratio was developed by (Sharpe, 1966) to evaluate the risk-adjusted per-
formance of mutual funds, taking into consideration the total risk of the portfolio, as opposed to
the Treynor ratio, taking into consideration only the systematic risk of the portfolio. Further,
Sharpe applied this ratio to evaluate U.S. mutual fund performances (Sharpe, 1966). From
his results, Sharpe found that a fraction of the outperforming funds continued to outperform.
But, from viewing findings as a whole, he concluded that investing in an actively managed
mutual fund was a poor investment, as findings suggested that mutual fund managers in his
sample seemed to use most of its fees to create diversification rather than finding underpriced
assets.
Later on, Jensen (1968) as mentioned, based upon the CAPM framework, developed
Jensen’s alpha. Jensen’s alpha is used to estimate the abnormal performance of a mutual
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fund. In theory, an actively managed mutual fund should create a positive alpha, whereas a
passive index should generate an alpha of zero. Jensen applied this tool in order to evaluate the
risk-adjusted performance of mutual fund returns. In Jensen’s paper from 1968, he evaluated
U.S. mutual funds and estimated their alpha net of fees. From his findings, he concluded that
on average, the mutual fund managers where not able to generate positive alpha.
Ippolito (1989) investigated U.S. mutual funds, and his findings lead him to state that
mutual funds, net of cost, actually outperformed the S&P500 index. However, in the evaluation
of mutual fund performance, the benchmark against which funds are measured is of great
importance. The choice of the benchmark can affect Jensen’s alpha as Lehmann and Modest
(1987) presented evidence of in their paper. As a result, Lehmann and Modest (1987) argued
that one needs an appropriate benchmark that will accurately represent the common factors
determined by security returns. Finally, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996) investigated the
findings of Ippolito (1989), and they found that the funds in Ippolito’s sample contained a
high amount of small stocks not included in the S&P500 index. The small stocks had a
significantly high return, which in turn had contributed to the outperformance of funds. Elton
et al. (1996) argued that Ippolito (1989) had employed an inappropriate benchmark, which in
turn had generated the findings of positive alpha. When adjusting the study conducted by
Ippolito, the positive alpha findings turned negative.
Another study critiqued due to the benchmark applied is that of Wermers (2000). Wermers
(2000) examined U.S. mutual funds and divided mutual fund performance based on net re-
turn and their stock holdings. When investigating the average mutual funds return and the
return on stock holdings, he found a difference of 2.3 percent in return. This difference was
mostly attributed to expenses and transaction costs. The remainder of the difference could be
accounted for as an underperformance of non-stock holdings. Later the same year, Moskowitz
(2000) critiqued Wermers (2000) on the use of his benchmarks, and in turn the findings in
his paper. Moskowitz (2000) argued that the benchmarks which Wermers’ had applied con-
sisted of small and risky firms. The firms included in the benchmark had generally performed
poorly over the sample period, which led to a skew in the results. From the application of the
benchmark, the findings of Wermers (2000) could have been inflated.
Underperformance of U.S. mutual funds is suggested in the paper of Malkiel (1995). In the
period 1971-1991, the returns of the investigated mutual funds did not provide evidence of the
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fund’s being able to ”beat the market”. The fact that benchmark choices affect findings led
to the creation of multi-factor models. The multi-factor models account for market anomalies.
Fama and French (1993) introduced one of the most used and most famous multi-factor models,
known as the three-factor model. The three-factor model extends the single-factor model
created by Jensen (1968) by two additional risk factors to the market factor, size (SMB) and
value (HML). Later, Carhart (1997) added a momentum factor to the three-factor model of
Fama and French, creating the Carhart four-factor model. The one-year momentum factor
that Carhart (1997) added was originally developed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
Gruber (1996) evaluated mutual funds between 1985 and 1994. He applied a four-factor
model, consisting of excess market return, the difference in return between small- and large-cap
portfolios, a factor measuring the difference in return between high growth- and a growth port-
folio, and finally, the excess return of a bond index. The findings of Gruber (1996) suggested
an underperformance of mutual funds when compared to a weighted average of indices. In the
same paper, however, Gruber (1996) investigated the funds gross of expenses. From this, he
argued that the fund managers had abilities to generate abnormal returns, and as such, the
managers had stock-picking skills. The stock-picking skill did not, however, cover their fees,
and thus the fees were not justified. Finally, he concluded that for the average investor, an
investment into these funds was not going to be worth it.
In an extensive study performed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), 2,500
U.S. mutual funds were investigated. The primary goal of the study was to uncover whether
fees were justified by the stock-picking skill of mutual fund managers. Daniel et al. (1997) in-
vestigated the connection between funds excess return and characteristic selectivity and char-
acteristic timing. From these connections, Daniel et al. (1997) found evidence of stock-picking
abilities among the mutual fund managers. More specifically, this was found in aggressive-
growth funds, with annual positive alpha. But, the alpha generated by these funds was very
close to the fees collected by the funds, which, in turn, makes the performance of the fund from
an investor’s perspective neutral. Another extensive study on mutual funds was conducted by
Blake and Timmermann (1998). With a sample of 2,300 U.K. mutual funds, they discovered
that on a risk-adjusted basis, the average U.K. mutual fund in the period underperformed by
about 1.8 percent.
Otten and Bams (2002) conducted a study where a total of 506 mutual funds from the
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European countries Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, and the U.K. were investigated.
Funds that had been closed within the period of investigation were not eliminated from the
sample. This was done to control for survivorship bias. In their paper, Otten and Bams (2002)
used the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) in order to evaluate funds. From the results,
they gathered evidence of positive alpha for returns where management fees had not been
subtracted from the funds in all five countries except Germany. Otten and Bams (2002) also
noted that the small-cap funds are especially able to add value for investors.
Edelen (1999) conducted a study where 166 U.S. mutual funds were under investigation.
Edelen (1999) applied the single-factor model proposed by Jensen (1968), using the CRSP
value-weighted index. Findings indicated that managers do little for investors besides collecting
fees. Finally, Edelen (1999) concluded that the managers did not generate the negative alpha
due to a lack of stock-picking skill, but rather as a result of the fees the managers collect.
The findings in studies presented so far have not made any clear cut answers as to whether
mutual fund managers are able to outperform the market, and as such inhabit stock-picking
skill. Some researchers find evidence of outperformance at least in the gross of fees returns.
However, looking at the aggregate level, most studies have found evidence of zero or negative
alpha. But, as argued by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), due to momentary mispricing of
market securities, some mutual funds outperform, and some underperform. Lastly, we note
the importance of appropriate benchmarks in the studies.
2.2 Evidence from Scandinavia
Studies conducted on Scandinavian mutual funds are far fewer than those published regarding
U.S. or larger countries in Europe. Yet, we have some evidence from Scandinavian markets in
relation to mutual fund performance. Some of the studies have also investigated the subject
of stock-picking skill vs. luck among the mutual funds investigated.
Sørensen (2009), as mentioned, conducted a study using the bootstrap procedure of Kosowski
et al. (2006). Sørensen employed the modifications introduced in Fama and French (2010) to
evaluate the performance of funds over a period from 1982 to 2008. Sørensen (2009), as re-
searchers before him, ensured a sample free of survivorship bias by including funds that had
been closed throughout the period. Through the findings, Sørensen (2009) concluded that
there was no evidence of stock-picking skill among the top-performing funds. When inves-
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tigating the worst performing funds of his sample, however, there was evidence of managers
skill level leading to abnormal negative performance. Gallefoss et al. (2015) also examined
Norwegian mutual funds through the methodology of Kosowski et al. (2006). Using daily
return observations in the period 2000-2010, findings from their investigation suggested that
there was significant evidence of both abnormal outperformance and underperformance among
the Norwegian mutual fund managers. The performance was attributed due to skill or a lack
thereof and not luck alone. However, when Gallefoss et al. (2015) turned to the aggregate
level, funds were concluded to underperform relative to the benchmark.
In the Danish mutual fund market, Christensen (2003) investigated mutual funds from
October 1994 to January 2002. Findings suggested neutral performance by most of the mutual
funds and some negative. There was, however, some evidence of market timing skill amongst
the mutual fund managers, yet most of these managers seemed to lack an ability in stock
selection. Later on, Christensen (2013) investigated the returns of funds over the period 2000
to 2010. From the 71 funds investigated, a small fraction generated statistically significant
alpha. However, the majority of funds generated negative alpha, where almost half of these
were statistically significant. Christensen (2013) also included a discussion about the fees
investors pay for entering and leaving the funds. Inclusion of these fees into the net-of-fees
returns would decrease the funds generated alpha even further.
Dahlquist, Engström, and Söderlind (2000) conducted a study of the Swedish mutual funds
in 1993-1997, where both performance and characteristics was investigated. Findings suggested
that most funds managed to generate a neutral performance. Interestingly, regular equity
funds were found to have an outperformance. From this, Dahlquist et al. (2000) concluded
that their discoveries suggested that actively managed funds performed better than investing
in a passive (index) fund. Flam and Vestman (2014) investigated actively managed Swedish
equity mutual funds in the period between 1999-2009. Before expenses, the average four-
factor alpha generated by funds was 0.9%. When expenses were deducted, however, the alpha
turned negative, more specifically to -0.5 %. Findings suggested further that persistence in the
returns was practically non-existent, and fund returns converged to the mean in a time span
of approximately two years. In addition, Flam and Vestman (2014) investigated whether there
was any evidence of skill, employing the bootstrap methodology of Kosowski et al. (2006) and
Fama and French (2010). From their analysis, they found no evidence of skill amongst the
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mutual fund managers. In a later study, Flam and Vestman (2017) investigated a longer period
of Swedish mutual fund returns. Here, they found evidence of outperformance in the Swedish
mutual funds for the period of 1993-2001, but not in the other part of the study, 2002-2013. In
this study, they employed a similar investigation as they did for the 1999-2009 sample, finding
similar results.
Finally, the Finnish mutual fund market between 1993 and 2000 was studied by Korkeamaki
and Smythe Jr. (2004). From their investigation, they found that the funds generally had a
neutral performance. However, contradicting the findings in the Swedish mutual fund market,
the equity funds mainly provided a negative performance relative to the benchmark.
The studies from Scandinavia offers contradicting evidence regarding both the performance
of mutual funds and whether this is due to luck or skill in the respective countries. Therefore,
we will dive deeper into the subject of luck versus skill in stock-picking among mutual fund
managers. Several international studies have been conducted on the topic, some of which we
will review in the following section.
2.3 Studies in Luck vs. Skill
Kosowski et al. (2006) apply a bootstrap method that is used to distinguish between skill
and luck. As such, this methodology will be applied to the Norwegian mutual fund returns
to determine whether the results of the mutual fund managers are due to skill or luck. The
bootstrapping methodology offers an advantage in that one does not need to specify the shape
of the distribution from which the returns are drawn (Kosowski et al., 2006).
White (2000) proposed a reality check in order to control for data snooping bias. This
was further applied by Kosowski et al. (2006). From their investigation of U.S. mutual funds,
Kosowski et al. (2006) found evidence of stock-picking skill, and lack thereof, for the top and
bottom 10 percent of funds respectively. That is, the top funds yielded returns so good that
it could not be attributed to luck alone, and, as such, had to be due to stock-picking skill.
Whereas, the bottom performers generated returns so low that one could not blame it on
bad luck alone, and some of the returns had to be attributed to the lack of skill in managers
stock-picking.
As argued by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), data snooping occurs because “the more scrutiny
a collection of data is subject to, the more likely will interesting (spurious) patterns emerge”.
9
Based on this, it is argued that data snooping (mining) biases increase the more one studies
the topic. Regarding the topic of luck vs. skill in the cross-section of alpha distributions, the
chance of one finding abnormalities or patterns in the data is relatively high.
The paper presented by Yan and Zheng (2017) focuses on fundamental-based variables that
were derived from financial statements. Yan and Zheng (2017) applied a bootstrap approach in
order to evaluate the data-mining bias inherent in the cross-sectional return anomalies and to
examine the fundamental signals derived from financial statements. Even after the application
of the bootstrap method to account for data mining, Yan and Zheng (2017) found evidence that
there are in fact elements that statistically significantly predict cross-sectional stock returns.
The evidence points to a more pronounced predictive ability for small, high-volatility stocks,
and that fundamental-based anomalies are based on expectations and mispricing as opposed
to data mining.
Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) employed the method of Kosowski et al. (2006) in
their attempt to separate fund performances based on luck from those performances based on
skill. In addition to the bootstrapping methodology, Barras et al. (2010) suggested that one
could use False Discovery Rates (FDR) in order to separate luck from skill. New FDR measures
were developed. These new measures allowed them to individually target the top and bottom
tails of the cross-sectional alpha distribution, and measured the impact of luck on the funds’
performance. The findings of Barras et al. (2010) from US equity funds, indicated that 7.1
percent of managers were skilled through the standard approach. However, when accounting
for luck, the funds were no longer able to generate positive alpha.
Fama and French (2010) modified the method proposed by Kosowski et al. (2006). Through
their investigation of U.S. mutual funds in the period 1984-2006, they found contradicting evi-
dence to Kosowski et al. (2006). Fama and French (2010) found no evidence of outperformance
on a net of fees basis. They did, however, mention that findings suggested that at very high
percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics of alpha, that funds gross of fees
could outperform the market. Further, Fama and French (2010) found similar evidence to
Kosowski et al. (2006) in the lowest percentiles, in that the bottom funds indeed suffer from a
lack of skill in the management of these funds.
Recently, Harvey and Liu (2020) investigated the error rates of the Fama and French (2010)
approach, using their proposed double bootstrap approach. From their investigation, Harvey
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and Liu (2020) found that the test lacks power in detecting outperformance. Through their
study, they find that the test power increases when the minimum amount of observations is
increased. When short series of returns are introduced into the bootstrapping methodology of
Fama and French (2010), Harvey and Liu (2020) argue that the returns from the bootstrapping
might be inflated, and as such, it is harder for a fund to overcome the statistical threshold and
be found as skillful. When increasing the minimum length of the return series, Harvey and Liu
(2020) found evidence of skill using a similar sample to Fama and French (2010). Note that
when increasing the minimum amount of observations, some funds had to be excluded from
the sample.
The method of Kosowski et al. (2006) was also used in a study conducted by Cuthbertson,
Nitzsche, and O’Sullivan (2008) in the investigation of U.K. mutual funds in the period 1975-
2002. Their findings supported those of Kosowski et al. (2006) in that bottom funds inhabited
a lack of stock-picking skill, and the top performers had stock-picking abilities.
2.4 Test Power
Harvey and Liu (2020) recently introduced a new methodology where one can evaluate the
Type I and Type II error rates of a statistical threshold or procedure using the data at hand.
Through a so-called double bootstrap approach, Harvey and Liu (2020) argue that, building on
the framework of False Discovery Rates, one is able to find empirical error rates for statistical
thresholds when applied to the sample at hand.
When the Type I error rate is high, this means that we have a high probability of falsely
rejecting the null hypothesis. If we are in a situation where the Type II error is high, this implies
that we have a high probability of failing to reject the null when the alternative hypothesis is
true. From a high Type II error, it follows that the test power is low (test power = 1 - Type
II error rate).
Ioannidis (2005) states that a low test power for alternative hypotheses, in turn, generates
a high Type I error rate for the main hypothesis tested. Andrikogannopoulou and Papakon-
stantinou (2019), Ferson and Yong (2017), and Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2019) have
also conducted studies with focus on the FDR approach of Barras et al. (2010), which in-
vestigated skill or luck among US equity funds. Further, researchers has developed multiple
testing techniques in related fields in financial economics. Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) focus
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on the Familywise Error Rate (FWER). In their paper, they present a stylized bayesian frame-
work for multiple testing. Through that approach, one indirectly achieves the multiple-testing
adjustment through the likelihood function.
Harvey (2017) suggests a bayesianized p-value, where the p-value of a test is corrected.
Here, one applies the minimum bayes factor. The minimum bayes factor adds to the bayesian
hypothesis testing but separates itself from the prior specification in that it focuses on the prior
that generates the minimum bayes factor. Barras et al. (2019) employs an FDR approach with
corrections. Despite the number of methods developed, we still face an obstacle as to which
correction method is most suitable for a given dataset. This cuts to the core of the approach
proposed by Harvey and Liu (2020), where the multiple testing correction is conducted via
a systematic approach, offering data-driven guidance on the relative performance of multiple
testing and adjustment methods.
The treatment of p0 in Harvey and Liu (2020) lies between the approaches of Harvey et
al. (2016) and Harvey (2017). Meaning that while the new approach does not delve into the
process of making assumptions on the prior distribution of p0, which one would later feed
into the proposed full-blown Bayesian framework (as is done in Harvey et al. (2016)), we also
diverge from the Harvey (2017) assumption of a degenerate prior. That is, the point mass
which concentrates on the value of the parameter that generates the minimum bayes factor.
This is done by exploring how the Type I and Type II error rates act as a response to changes
in p0.
Building on Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), Genovese and Wasserman (2002) and Sarkar
(2006) proposed an alternative way to measure the Type II error rate, the false non-discovery
rate. The false non-discovery rate is defined as the portion of false non-rejections among those
tests whose null hypotheses are not rejected. Here, Harvey and Liu (2020) rather applies a
measure where their definition of the Type II error rate is the number of false non-rejections
divided by the number of true negatives plus false negatives. This is done to differentiate




This section aims to provide readers with the models applied in this thesis to investigate
the performance of mutual fund managers. In addition, the method of bootstrapping will be
discussed, along with how this can be used to distinguish skill and luck. As evident from many
studies, it is within reason to expect abnormal performance in the tails of the distribution.
Therefore, separating skill from luck will be crucial. In order to distinguish this, the bootstrap
approach of Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French (2010), and Harvey and Liu (2020) is
applied.
3.1 Model Selection
The well-known abnormal performance measure, alpha, will be used in order to evaluate the
performance of mutual funds. Funds are ranked by their t-statistic of alpha to take into
consideration the sampling uncertainty. Through a time series regression in R, the abnormal
performance of funds excess return is estimated.
3.1.1 Single-factor Model
The previous literature review introduced some models used in past studies. Here, a more
detailed description of Jensen’s alpha is provided, which is an essential building block for the
models we will discuss. Jensen (1968) based the single-factor model on the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, revealing the relationship between risk and return for assets, based on the
exposure of the asset to the market factor. The CAPM was altered by Jensen, adding Jensen’s
alpha, in order to measure whether an asset would create an abnormal return according to
CAPM. If we observe a positive alpha, this states an outperformance in relation to CAPM.
Conversely, a negative alpha correspond to an underperfomance. If markets are, as proposed
by Fama (1970), perfectly efficient, alpha would disappear, equalling zero. The single-factor
model is stated as
rj,t = αj + βjMKTt + εt, (1)
where, rj,t is the excess return of asset j in time period t, αj expresses the abnormal return
of asset j, and βj represents the change in the assets excess return in relation to the markets
excess return. That is, the beta measures the sensitivity of the asset in relation to the market.
13
MKT is the market excess return in the same period. Finally, εt represents the individual
assets specific risk. This is the non-systematic risk, which is diversifiable.
3.1.2 Fama-French Three-factor Model
The single-factor model proposed by Jensen (1968) was debated in the ’80s and ’90s. Re-
searchers (Reinganum, 1981; Breeden, Gibbons, & Litzenberger, 1989) argued that the model
was not complete enough to explain the return of assets. Fama and French (1993) improved on
the single-factor model of Jensen, arguing that additional risk factors contributed to returns.
By adding the two factors of size (SMB) and value (HML), they constructed the three-factor
model. The size factor that Fama and French (1993) created, was made by putting companies
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ
Stock Market into different portfolios. The companies were selected for the different portfolios
based on size. The same process was used for the value factor.
The two factors, SMB and HML, warrant some further explanation. SMB stands for
Small (S) capitalization, Minus (M) the portfolio return of Big (B) capitalization companies.
As for the HML-factor, accounting for the value premium, companies were put into one of
two groups based on their book-to-market ratio, High(H) or Low (L), M represents a minus.
Bauman, Conover, and Miller (1998) conducted a study where they argue that over time,
small-capitalization companies generate higher returns than what large companies do, backing
the HML factor of Fama and French (1993).
Grouping the companies were a continuous process throughout the years of the conducted
research from 1963 up to 1993. From these groups, they then produced six portfolios in order
to create the baseline for the SMB and HML factors, all represented in the equations below.


























The idea behind the SMB-factor is that it enables the comparison of low market-value compa-






















HML represents the average return of high book-to-market ratio minus low book-to-market
ratio average returns, i.e., we are subtracting the return of growth portfolios from the value
portfolios. From equation 3, we gather that a positive HML value corresponds to a higher
return in value portfolios than that of growth portfolios, and a negative HML value correspond
to a higher return in growth portfolios relative to value portfolios.
With the two factors in equation (2) and equation (3) combined with the model (1), we
can generate the proposed Fama-French three-factor model:
rj,t = αj + βjMKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εj,t, (4)
where the coefficients β2 and β3 represent the effect of the SMB-factor and HML-factor in
period t on the excess return of the asset.
3.1.3 Carhart Four-factor Model
The three-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993) was further extended by Carhart
(1997). Carhart added a momentum factor (PR1YR), based on the study of Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993), which aimed to incorporate the one-year momentum anomaly. The one-year
momentum factor accounts for the market anomaly that increasing (decreasing) stocks will
continue to increase (decrease) in the following month. In order to generate the momentum
factor, a portfolio of the best performing stock returns is subtracted the return of a portfolio of
the worst-performing stocks. Adding the momentum factor to the three-factor model of Fama
and French results in the following model:
rj,t = αj + βjMKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4PR1Y Rt + εj,t, (5)
in equation (5) we see that the additional coefficient, β4, represents the effect of the one-year
momentum factor on the return of the asset. The rest of the coefficients and risk factors
correspond to the explanations to model (1) and model (4). The four risk factors in Carharts
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model are not diversifiable. The four-factor model will be the main performance model in the
study, as it is used by Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010). Further, it will be
applied in the multiple test proposed by Harvey and Liu (2020).
That said, both the single-factor and three-factor models will be applied to illustrate dif-
ferences in results.
3.2 Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is used in the methodology corresponding to Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama
and French (2010) in separating skill from luck. In addition, the methodology of Harvey and Liu
(2020), accounting for error rates applies bootstrapping. The use of bootstrapping circumvents
the problems of parametric tests when dealing with intricate dependencies in the cross-section
of non-normal returns. The joint-test bootstrap procedure relies on fewer assumptions due to
its robustness to dependencies in the cross-section. Also, it allows for general distributional
characteristics in that one does not have to assume any distributional characteristics. Lastly,
the procedure automatically takes the sampling uncertainty into account (Yan & Zheng, 2017).
When applying the bootstrap methodology, one also controls for data snooping. Data
snooping as presented by, as mentioned, White (2000) is also known as data mining. Data
snooping is a pitfall when conducting statistical analysis. In this thesis, data snooping could
occur, as we estimate the same measures for multiple entities. As such, findings from individual
Carhart four-factor regressions might be biased. Another example could be that one is looking
for correlations in a massive data sample, and only report a small subset of this. Then, as
White (2000) presented it, data snooping occurs. Further, this can result in forecasting models
that look usable, despite there not being any exploitable forecasting relations in the sample,
due to studying the sample at lengths. To control for this, White (2000) applied a Bootstrap
Reality Check, referred to as White’s Reality Check.
Bootstrapping procedures can be used to estimate the unknown distribution of a parameter.
This is why the bootstrapping procedure is so appealing in an investigation of mutual funds.
We are here able to investigate skill vs. luck by generating a distribution of the alpha under
the null of no skill. That is, if we set alpha to zero, what would the distribution of alpha be?
From this, we can infer whether the generated alpha of a fund is due to luck or skill.
The bootstrapping procedure is a cross-sectional methodology. In traditional Ordinary
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Least Square (OLS) regressions, a key assumption is the normal distribution of residuals. Sev-
eral properties within the data may lead to this assumption not holding. Statistical significance
is easier to test in the framework of Jensen’s alpha in comparison to the Sharpe ratio. This
is due to the fact that Share-ratio fails to differentiate anomalies, leading to the ability to
manipulate results in the use of the Sharpe ratio. The use of factor models is, however, not
a flawless approach, as the separation of luck and skill is not always possible. Both the cross-
section of mutual fund alpha and the individual fund level alpha will be studied on possible
non-normalities.
The reason why fund returns experience kurtosis and skewness not corresponding to the
normal distribution since fund managers usually hold big positions in a lower amount of stocks,
rather than the opposite. As such, the central limit theorem fails, i.e., we do not experience
the phenomena where an equally weighted portfolio of non-normally distributed stock returns
approach normality. This fact, in turn, invalidates the use of parametric tests. There is also a
tendency for stock returns to be heteroscedastic, and, in addition, have autocorrelation in the
series.
The last point concerns the investment strategies of the mutual funds. The different invest-
ment strategies may lead to different and altering risk preferences. Altering risk preferences
may be due to performance compared to similar portfolios or funds, or the overall market
(Kosowski et al., 2006). When the mentioned properties affect the sample, non-normality in
alpha distribution occurs. Applying the Jarque-Bera test, one can evaluate the normality of
residuals in the models presented above. For instance, when applying the Jarque-Berra test to
the estimation of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model of equation (5), normality in mutual
fund residuals is rejected frequently.
This is where the bootstrapping methodology comes in handy. As we circumvent distri-
butional assumptions, the validity of inferences may be improved significantly. Researchers
have widely argued that bootstrapping enables a more definite assessment of alpha estimate
significance (Bickel & Freedman, 1984; Fama & French, 2010; Hall & Martin, 1988; Horowitz,
2003; Kosowski et al., 2006). Through a Monte Carlo experiment, Horowitz (2003) were able
to illustrate the effect of bootstrapping. His findings suggested that there was a significant
reduction between the true probability and the nominal probability of correctly rejecting the
null, i.e., reduction of the Type I Error rate. Through Horowitz (2003) study, he proved that
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the standard parametric t-test rejects abnormal performance less frequently than the boot-
strapping procedure. The key being that bootstrapping procedures recognize the thicker than
normal tails often found in fund returns.
Through the cross-sectional distribution of mutual fund residuals being built up of individ-
ual fund distributions, and the assumption of normalities is disabled. These funds are identified
by: 1. Heterogeneous risk-taking in funds throughout the sample and 2. increased momentum
in individual fund residuals. Despite funds having normally distributed residuals, this does
not automatically lead to the cross-sectional distribution being normal. When considering the
joint distribution of all funds in the sample, the bootstrapping approach will allow for more
accurate inferences than if we were to rely on parametric assumptions and conducting a para-
metric test. The bootstrapping is done by resampling with replacements, and through this
generating the statistic for each resample.
3.2.1 Kosowski et al. Approach
The Kosowski et al. (2006) bootstrapping procedure conducts its procedure under the null
hypothesis of zero true performance, or equivalently, no superior fund manager exists. The
alternative hypothesis of this is that we have true performance in the tails. Specifically, that
αTop > 0 and αBottom < 0. The basis for the bootstrap procedure of Kosowski et al. (2006) is
created through the estimation of the OLS regression of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
presented in equation (5). We estimate the four-factor model for each individual fund, j,
ending up with the following estimated model,
r̂j,t = α̂j + β̂1,jMKTt + β̂2,jSMBt + β̂3,jHMLt + β̂4,jPR1Y Rt + ε̂j,t. (6)
From the OLS regression, one needs to store the coefficient estimates for each fund j, α̂j , β̂1,j , β̂2,j , β̂3,j , β̂4,j .
In addition, the estimated residuals for each time period and each fund are stored, ε̂j,t, where t
goes from the first to the last month of observation of fund j respectively. Lastly, the t-statistic
of alpha for each fund is stored, t̂α̂j . One could equivalently to storing the coefficient estimates
store the fitted values from the regression, and apply these in order to generate the pseudo
sample of returns below instead of coefficient estimates.
From the stored regression estimates, one turns to the construction of a pseudo-random
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time-series of resampled residuals. This is created through randomly drawing samples, with
replacement from the estimated residuals of fund j. We impose the restriction of the pseudo
sample having the same length as the original return series. The length is given by, ε̂bj,tε , tε =
Sbtj ,0,.....,Tj,1 . Here, b represents the bootstrap iteration, whereas t, ..., T defines the starting
point and end of the series. After having created the pseudo-sample of residuals, we fetch the
saved coefficient estimates.
Through combining the pseudo-sample of residuals and the coefficient estimates, a pseudo-
monthly time-series of excess returns for fund j is created. In this step, the null hypothesis
of zero alpha performance is implemented. This is done via subtracting the estimated alpha
from each fund’s returns. Due to sampling uncertainty, this will not result in zero alpha for
the pseudo-monthly time-series, although the null will still hold. We estimate the four-factor
model of equation (6) for the pseudo sample of excess returns for each fund. The pseudo
sample of excess return is given by
rbi,j = 0 + β̂1,jMKTt + β̂2,jSMBt + β̂3,jHMLt + β̂4,jPR1Y Rt + ε̃
b
i,t, (7)
where the pseudo sample return has zero alpha, and consists of multiplying the estimated
coefficients of the fund to the risk factors in a given month. We add the bootstrapped residual,
and then proceed to run another OLS regression on the pseudo sample return series. The
procedure will be conducted J = 10, 000 times for each individual fund. As such, we may
obtain a non-zero estimated alpha for a random bootstrap iteration b. That is, when we apply
the four-factor model to the pseudo return series, it may occur that for a given bootstrap
sample, we have drawn an abnormal amount of positive or negative alpha, resulting from the
sampling variation surrounding the zero true performance and the drawn residuals.
For each run of the 10,000 bootstrap iterations, we build the cross-sectional distribution of
bootstrapped t-statistic of alpha for each fund (i = 1, 2, ..., 107). We thus end up with 10,000
cross-sectional distributions of bootstrapped t-statistics. We place all bootstrapped t-statistics
into a matrix, creating a J × N matrix, where J is the number of bootstrap iterations, and
N is the number of funds. For each row in the matrix of bootstrapped t-statistic, we sort the
t-statistics from highest to lowest. That is, the highest bootstrapped t-statistic is found in
column 1, and the lowest is found in column N , for each bootstrap iteration.
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Finally, the bootstrapped p-values is calculated as the sum of bootstrapped t-statistics
greater than the actual t-statistic divided by the number of iterations when the actual t-
statistic is greater than 0. When the actual t-statistic is smaller than 0, the bootstrapped
p-value is calculated as the sum of bootstrapped t-statistics lower than the actual t-statistic
divided by the number of iterations. More specifically, for each fund we apply the following
equation,




J , if ti,actual > 0∑J
j=1 ti,bootstrap<ti,actual
J , ifti,actual < 0,
(8)
where ti,bootstrap represent the bootstrapped t-statistics at percentile i and ti,actual represent
the actual t-statistic at percentile i from the original data.
The reason for using the t-statistic of alpha, as opposed to the alpha estimate itself, is due
to the fact that the t-statistic of alpha has been argued to have a superior predictive ability
as a sorting term when comparing performance under the assumption of zero alpha across
all funds (Busse, Goyal, & Wahal, 2010; Fama & French, 2010; Kosowski et al., 2006). This
is because mutual funds with short return series characterized by high risk will have greater
variance in estimated alpha distribution, which, in turn, generates outliers in the cross-section.
The t-statistic of alpha addresses this issue and penalizes a high alpha estimate connected to
high variance by reducing the corresponding t-statistic through the standard error.
The bootstrap approach of Kosowski et al. (2006) can be summarized in the following steps:
I Estimate the model in equation (6) and store the estimates of alpha, factor loadings,
residuals, and t-statistic of alpha for each fund.
II Create a pseudo return series, as in equation (7) for each individual fund, with zero alpha
imposed, through bootstrapping the residuals of the fund.
III Regress the pseudo return series on factor returns, store the bootstrapped t-statistic of
alpha for the pseudo return series.
IV Repeat steps II and III J times for each fund i in the sample.
V Sort each row of the J ×N matrix of bootstrapped t-statistics from low to high. Making
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J CDFs of bootstrapped t-statistics.
VI Calculate the bootstrapped p-value for each percentile as in equation 8.
3.2.2 Fama & French Approach
Next, we turn to the approach of Fama and French (2010), where the goal of the approach
is to draw inferences regarding the cross-section of the true α for actively managed funds.
Specifically, if we find evidence from the cross-section of alpha estimates that suggest a world
with true α of zero for all funds, or whether we, in fact, experience nonzero true α. We
especially regard the tails of the cross-section of α estimates. In this thesis, the net returns
of the Norwegian mutual funds are applied. When setting α = 0 for the net returns of the
funds, the null hypothesis is the following: We live in a world where mutual fund managers
can generate returns covering the fees they require. The alternative is thus that performance
in the tails is due to skill as opposed to luck. Specifically, that αtop > 0 for the top performers
and αbottom < 0 for bottom performers.
Fama and French (2010) and Kosowski et al. (2006) frameworks are pretty similar, however,
there are differences that makes applications of both in investigation interesting. Kosowski et
al. (2006) imposes their null hypothesis of zero alpha through subtracting estimated alpha
from fitted values. Fama and French (2010) impose the null through subtracting the alpha
estimate from the actual return series of funds. In Fama and French (2010) we simulate fund
returns and factor returns jointly, whereas Kosowski et al. (2006) bootstrap residuals only in
their baseline bootstrap.
Preceding the bootstrapping procedure, the setup is conducted in the following way. We
run an OLS regression, as in the Kosowski et al. (2006) framework, estimating the same model
of equation (6), and storing the same estimates. The following steps are where the framework
of Fama and French (2010) differs from that of Kosowski et al. (2006).
In the Fama and French (2010) test for nonzero true α in the actual fund returns, one
bootstrap in order to generate return series which have the property of fund returns. The
difference, true α is set to zero for each and every fund. Specifically, we subtract the estimated
alpha from the excess returns of the respective funds (ri,t − α̂i). From this we estimate, fund
by fund, the statistic of the bootstrap procedure, using a random sample with replacement of
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the 396 months drawn from the full length of the time series sample of 396 months.
When conducting the Kosowski et al. (2006) approach, the random sample of monthly
returns is different for each fund in each bootstrap iteration. Whereas in the bootstrapping
approach of Fama and French (2010), it is done with the same random sample of months for
all funds. That is, in the Kosowski et al. (2006) approach, the first observation for fund j
might be t = 10, whereas the first observation of fund k might be t = 96 in the same bootstrap
iteration. For the Fama and French (2010) approach, it is ensured that the t = 10 is used in
the first observation of all funds in a given iteration. This ensures capturing cross-correlation
of the fund returns, and the effects on the distribution on the t-statistic of alpha estimates.
The joint sampling approach of sample fund and explanatory returns captures any corre-
lated heteroscedasticity in the explanatory returns and disturbances in the benchmark model.
However, this also leads to a loss of any potential effect of autocorrelation in the factor re-
turns, and losing any effects of variation through time in the regression slopes. Using the
bootstrapped time series, we construct the following excess return series:
(ri,t − α̂i) = β̂1,iMKT b + β̂2,iSMBb + β̂3,iHMLb + β̂1,iPR1Y Rb + ε̃bi . (9)
From the pseudo return series generated above, we regress, on the risk factors for each fund.
From the regressions, we then store the estimated t-statistic of alpha of the pseudo excess
return series.
After having run J = 10.000 bootstrap simulations, we estimate the t-statistics of alpha
for the pseudo excess returns. We then end up with J = 10.000 cross-sectional distributions
of bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha. As in the Kosowski et al. (2006) approach. We next sort
each of the cross-sectional distributions from high to low.
Fama and French (2010) draw inferences in a similar manner to that of Kosowski et al.
(2006). However, they also compare the average bootstrapped t-statistics over the 10,000
bootstrap iterations at a given percentile to the actual t-statistic at the same percentile drawn
from the actual t-statistic distribution. In addition, rather than presenting the bootstrapped
p-values, they present likelihoods.
The likelihoods are calculated by finding the percent of bootstrapped t-statistics at a given
percentile that is below that of the same percentile in the actual t-statistics distribution. If we
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then experience a low likelihood for the worst performers, we can infer that some managers in
fact lack skills that suffice to cover their fees. For ease of comparison for the two approaches,
bootstrapped p-values are calculated from the bootstrapping procedure of Fama and French
(2010).
The Fama and French (2010) approach can be summarized in the following steps:
I Estimate the model in equation (5) and store the estimates of alpha, factor loadings,
residuals, and t-statistic of alpha for each fund.
II Generate pseudo excess return series with imposed zero alpha for each fund, as in equation
(9), by bootstrapping factor returns and residuals through a common time ordering for
all funds in a given iteration.
III Regress the pseudo return from step II on the factor returns. Store the bootstrapped
t-statistic of alpha for each fund.
IV Repeat steps II-III J times, in order to generate J cross-sectional distributions of boot-
strapped t-statistic of alpha.
V Sort each row in the J ×N number of funds matrix from low to high.
VI Calculate the bootstrapped p-value for each percentile as in equation 8.
3.2.3 Double Bootstrap Approach by Harvey & Liu (2020)
Harvey and Liu (2020) also apply bootstrapping in their paper, although they first and fore-
most apply the bootstrapping methodology to evaluate error rates of statistical thresholds or
statistical procedures.
Harvey and Liu (2020) argue that by running two rounds of bootstrapping, both rounds
based on the original data, one can evaluate error rates of statistical thresholds specific to the
data set at hand. The reason why this approach is so appealing is that the Type I errors
are likely too frequent if one applies single-hypothesis testing criteria in a multiple hypothesis
situation. Due to the high Type I error rate follows a large number of managers will look like
they outperform the market purely by luck.
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The double bootstrap approach first determines a performance threshold that delivers a
particular Type I error rate. Next, one characterizes the Type II error rate associated with
this optimized Type I error rate.
In the framework of Harvey and Liu (2020), one assumes that a fraction of mutual fund
managers p0 has skill, or a lack thereof if one wishes to evaluate the bottom performers. The
skill level of managers is set at the in-sample performance measurement estimate. The rest of
the managers, 1 − p0, are assumed to have no skill, setting their skill level to 0 (zero excess
return or zero alpha).
When bootstrapping from these adjusted return series, one is able to evaluate the Type
II error rate through the use of simulations. Through the use of p0, the difficulty in setting
the high-dimensional parameter vector for the alternative hypothesis is circumvented. The
parameter vector is set to a reasonable value, e.g., the in-sample estimate corresponding to
a certain p0. In essence, we treat p0 as a sufficient statistic, helping in the estimation of the
Type II error rate.
p0 has several interpretations. When p0 is set to zero, no manager is believed to be in
possession of skill. This correspond to the null hypothesis applied in Kosowski et al. (2006)
and Fama and French (2010). Setting p0 greater than zero, assume that some managers are
believed to be outperforming. In this case, one can think of p0 as a plug-in parameter, similar
to the role of µ0 in a single test of the mean of a statistic, which helps measure the error rates
in the presence of a multiple test.
In running the double bootstrap, one selects p0 outperformers in the sample, which are, in
the second round bootstrap, known as true outperformers. The reason for using two rounds
of bootstrapping is that if one instead chose the p0 true strategies from the actual ranked
t-statistics, one would be ignoring the sampling uncertainty. When bootstrapping the data
in an initial first-round bootstrap, and then selecting the top-performing funds based on the
highest t-statistics, the sampling uncertainty is circumvented.
The double-bootstrap method starts by selecting p0 × N funds which are deemed to be
truly outperforming. To take sampling uncertainty into account, one perturbs the data, and
then ranks the funds based on the t-statistics from the perturbation. Specifically, the periods
of the original data X0 are bootstrapped, giving an alternative panel of returns, Xi. Next, for
the panel Xi, funds are ranked based on their t-statistics.
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For the top p0 funds, with the highest t-statistics, we locate the funds in the original
sample, X0. The corresponding funds are adjusted to have the same alpha as that creating the
t-statistic in Xi. The data matrix of adjusted funds having non-zero alpha is denoted X
(i)
0,1.
The remaining funds, 1−p0, are adjusted to have zero abnormal performance, i.e. alpha set to






0,0 are arranged into
one new data panel, Yi. The return series in Yi is hypothetical data, which is used to evaluate
the follow-up error rate analysis, where the true number of over- /underperformers is known.
The bootstrapping of the adjusted panel of returns Yi allows us to evaluate error rates, as
mentioned, for a statistical procedure. This will be done for fixed t-statistic thresholds. Via
the creation of the two adjusted panels and combining them into one, we know exactly which
funds in the panel are actually truly outperforming, and which are falsely outperforming.
By doing this, we can summarize the testing outcome of a statistical threshold for the jth
bootstrap iteration. We place these outcomes into a vector, Ōi,j = (TN i,j , FP i,j , FN i,j , TP i,j ,
where TN i,j (True Negative) corresponds to the number of tests that correctly identify a
zero-alpha fund as having zero alpha. FP i,j (False Positive) is the number of zero-alpha
funds identified as being outperforming, FN i,j (False Negative) is the number of tests that
incorrectly identify a true outperformer as not outperforming. Finally, TP i,j (True Positive)
is the number of tests that correctly identifies a true outperformer as outperforming. With the
summary statistics in the vector Ōi,j , we are able to construct the two error rates used in the
evaluation of the statistical thresholds.
The first, motivated by the False Discovery Rate (FDR), is the realized FDR. The realized





, if FP i,j + TP i,j > 0
0, ifFP i,j + TP i,j = 0
(10)
That is, the realized FDR measures the fraction of false rejections of the null among all rejec-
tions of the null, both false and true. The Type I error rate in a single test is extended by the
expected value of the realized FDR. The second error rate we measure is the realized rate of
misses, also referred to as the false non-discovery rate or false omission rate. The realized rate






, if FN i,j + TN i,j > 0
0, if FN i,j + TN i,j = 0.
(11)
From this, we see that the fraction of missed rejections of the null (i.e., FN i,j) among all the
insignificant outcomes FN i,j + TN i,j measures the realized rate of misses. This extends the
Type II error rate in a single test through the expected value of RMISS.





, if FN i,j > 0,
0, if FN i,j = 0.
(12)
This is similar to the odds ratio concept used in Bayesian analysis. We here take the ratio of
false discoveries, FP i,j , to misses, FN i,j . This ratio can help us in selecting the appropriate
cutoff t-statistic based on one’s belief of the cost of making Type I and Type II errors.
Finally, the sampling uncertainty due to ranking the funds and generating realized error
rates for each of these rankings is accounted for by averaging across both i and j. Thus, if we
suppose that we perturb the original data I times, and then for each i generate J bootstrapped


















and refer to this as the Type II error rate. Finally, the sampling uncertainty is accounted for









Note that the estimated Type I error rate and Type II error rate implicitly depend on the
significance threshold applied in the calculations. Further, the Type II error rate is linked
to power, and the RMISS in equation (11) definition implies a different interpretation of test
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power. Note that the way in which Harvey and Liu (2020) have defined the realized rate of
misses implies that one takes into account the number of funds or strategies. When including all
true discoveries into the denominator in the fraction for RMISS, it is implied that the statistical
threshold is more impressive if it is possible to detect a small number of true outperformers in
a large sample than detecting the same number of outperformers in a small sample.
The way in which the Type II error rate is usually, and most frequently calculated for




FN i,j + TP i,j
. (16)
As mentioned, this generates a different Type II error rate than the proposed calculation of
Harvey and Liu (2020). Here, the sampling uncertainty mentioned above is taken into account








TY PEIIi,j , (17)
we get the Type II error rate for the total simulations in the double bootstrap approach.
The Harvey and Liu (2020) double-bootstrapping methodology can be divided into a four-
step procedure.
I Run the first round bootstrap. That is, bootstrap the time periods in the sample to
obtain a new, bootstrapped return series matrix, Xi. Next, estimate the corresponding
1xN vector of t-statistics, ti.
II Rank the t-statistics found in ti. Then, find the corresponding funds in the original
data matrix X0 for the p0 top funds. Next, adjust the corresponding strategies so that
they have the same alpha as that generated by Xi. We denote the matrix containing
adjusted fund returns X
(i)
0,1. The remaining funds in X0 are adjusted to have zero alpha
and collected in a matrix denoted X
(i)





0,0 into one new panel of returns, Yi.
III Bootstrap the time periods in Yi J times. Then, for each bootstrapped sample, j in one
to J, calculate the realized error rates for Yi, which we denote by fi,j (f represents a
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generic error rate that is a function of the testing outcomes).










The bootstrapping procedure for the basis of this thesis is a stationary bootstrap, as proposed
by Politis and Romano (1994) by re-sampling the return residuals in data blocks. In the Fama
and French (2010) framework, we allow for cross-correlation in the residuals and correlation in
factor returns and residuals. Robustness is checked in the Kosowski et al. (2006) framework
through varying block lengths of the bootstrap.
The distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha is smoothed by generating portfolios
of funds. This allows for inspection of whether cross-sectional individual fund alpha analysis is
affecting inference tests. Here, the corresponding average statistic in each tail of the portfolios
is considered.
The lengths of data records are also considered. This is done by varying the minimum
amount of monthly returns. Results of bootstrap extensions are presented and discussed in
Section 5.3.
4 Data
This section aims to present the data used in the evaluation of the Norwegian mutual fund
performance in the sample. The review of data furthermore creates the basis for empirical
analysis presented in Section 5.
4.1 Norwegian Mutual Fund Sample
The dataset used in this thesis is comprised of 107 actively managed Norwegian mutual funds,
which all have varying lengths of returns recorded in the time period of 1987 to 2019. Funds
are required to have a minimum of 12 monthly returns in order to be included in the sample.
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There is, however, no exclusion of funds that have closed throughout the period or opened
after the inception of the period.
Funds are also required to hold at least 80% domestic equities to be eligible for the sample.
Lastly, funds with neutral investment strategies, i.e., passively managed or index funds, are
not considered. The choice of time period is based on the availability of sufficient market
information on both fund and benchmark returns. Here, the restriction of only allowing Nor-
wegian mutual funds into the sample is done to safeguard comparison of fund returns to an
appropriate benchmark. The risk exposure varies from market to market, and the limitation
on funds allows for the use of only one benchmark.
The TITLON database (Titlon, 2020) provides historical fund data, including complete
daily information on the funds’ Net Asset Value (NAV) throughout the period. The NAV of a
fund represents its per-share market value. We use adjusted NAV, where ongoing costs such as
management fees have been deducted, and the dividends are taken into consideration. From
the last reported adjusted NAV of each month, returns for each fund have been created. The
adjusted NAV of fund i in a given time period t provides the net of costs one-month simple





The average lifetime of funds in the sample is approximately 13.6 years. Table A.I., Appendix
A, displays the number of observations for each fund in the thesis, along with various descriptive
statistics of the funds’ returns for the whole period the funds are open in the dataset.
All funds in the Norwegian fund market are domestic open-end funds. An open-end fund
is where shares in the fund may be redeemed or issued without any limitation, as opposed to
a closed-end fund, where investors wanting to sell their shares in the fund have to find a buyer
willing to pay the price. As such, for closed-end funds, the price for a share in the fund may
differ from the NAV of the fund.
4.2 Interest Rate
In order to calculate the excess return of both the individual funds and the benchmark, one
needs to subtract the risk-free rate of return. In economic literature, treasury bills returns
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are widely accepted as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return. The liquidity of Norwegian
treasuries is poor in comparison to other more comprehensive markets. Instead, the risk-free
rate is constructed based on the one-month Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) as
argued by Ødegaard (2021b). The NIBOR aims to reflect the interest rate of unsecured money
market lending between banks. Due to messy data in the years prior to 1987, for the one-month
NIBOR, it would be difficult to incorporate this as the risk-free rate proxy for years before
1987. Therefore, the risk-free rate proxy is based on the same measure for the sample period
as a whole, instead of incorporating Norwegian treasuries in the first part of the sample. In
doing so, we maintain consistency for the thesis. A time-series plot of the one-month NIBOR
can be viewed in Appendix B.
4.3 The Market Proxy: Benchmark Index
The benchmark used in mutual fund performance evaluation is crucial, as previous research
has shown; see the literature Section. One needs to establish a benchmark that represents a
fitting market return. In an ideal world, the market portfolio from CAPM would be used.
However, this is not readily available. Therefore, we need a reasonable approximation of the
market portfolio. Oslo Stock Exchange provides several indices that could serve as proxies
for the market return. The Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) consists of the
most-traded shares on Oslo Stock Exchange. Oslo Stock Exchange All-Share Index (OSEAX)
consists of all shares listed on the exchange. The OSEAX is adjusted for dividend payments
and corporate actions daily. In addition, there is a Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX) at Oslo Stock
Exchange, frequently used as a benchmark by Norwegian mutual funds in their reports. The
OSEFX serves as a natural benchmark, complying with UCITS directives in addition to being
designed to meet diversification requirements.
However, the OSEFX originated in 1995, whereas the mutual fund sample origins in 1987.
Thus, the OSEFX cannot function as a market proxy in the years from 1987 to 1994. In the
investigation of the fund performances, we want to incorporate only one benchmark for the
whole period, 1987-2019.
Based on this, the most fitting market proxy is the OSEAX. We thus use the OSEAX as
the market proxy. Data for OSEAX is provided by Ødegaards database (Ødegaard, 2020) and
described in (Ødegaard, 2021a), where the least liquid and smallest stocks are filtered out.
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4.4 Risk Factors
Data on risk factors for the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and the Fama-French three-
factor model is provided by Ødegaard based on empirical data from the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Ødegaard has provided a database that contains data on all the risk factors needed, including
the market factor (MKT), Small-Minus-Big (SMB), High-Minus-Low (HML), and lastly, the
one-year momentum (PR1YR) (Ødegaard, 2020).
The data in Ødegaards database is described in Ødegaard (2021a) and Ødegaard (2021b).
The SMB factor considers small-capitalization companies’ average return minus big (large)
capitalization companies’ returns. HML consists of the difference between the average return on
high book-to-market ratio portfolios and the average return of low book-to-market ratios, that
is, value minus growth. The PR1YR is the prior-one-year factor, calculated as the difference
between the highest one-year lagged return and lowest one-year lagged return in holding the
stock. Note that shorting of stocks is not considered for this factor. Factor loadings for each
individual fund are provided in Appendix A Table A.II.
In the investigation of the funds’ ability to generate returns in excess of the risk factors,
it is important to consider the returns of the risk factors themselves. Figure 1 shows the
cumulative log-returns of the risk factors from inception to 2019. We see that the momentum
factor generated the highest cumulative return in the period, followed closely by the SMB
factor. The market excess return factor is volatile in the years leading up to 2010, past this
point it moves in a narrower channel upwards. Cumulative log-return of the market proxy,
not subtracted the risk-free rate, is shown in Figure 2 panel A. Lastly, the HML factor has the
lowest cumulative return out of the risk factors considered.
We now turn to other properties of the risk factors, taking a look at the mean return, stan-
dard deviation, maximum monthly return, and minimum monthly return. This is calculated
for each risk factor, and we evaluate them through the whole sample period. In addition, we
investigate four sub-sample periods. Lastly, we look at the correlation between the risk factor
returns for the period as a whole.
We see, as indicated by the cumulative log-returns in Figure 1, that the momentum factor
has the highest mean return for the sample period as a whole, followed by the SMB- and
market factor, respectively. What is also interesting to note, is that the momentum factor has
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Figure 1: The figure presents the cumulative log-returns of the risk factors considered in this thesis.
The cumulative log-returns are calculated from inception in 1987 for each month throughout the whole
sample period. The MKT factor represents the excess return of the OSEAX (black). The cumulative
log-return of SMB and HML is shown in red and blue lines, respectively. Finally, the momentum























the second narrowest range of returns, with a max of 15.43% and a min of -16.78%, second to
the HML factor. The market factor has the highest standard deviation among the risk factors.
Descriptive statistics of the market proxy not subtracting the risk-free rate is shown as OSEAX
in Table 2. The SMB factor has the lowest standard deviation for the period as a whole. Still,
the SMB factor has the second-highest mean return.
In the first sub-period, 1987-1995 Q1, the HML factor generated a mean return of 14.15%
after this sub-period. Although the mean return of the factor was negative for the following
three periods. The standard deviation of the HML factor decreases throughout the four sub-
periods as well as the range of its monthly returns. Looking at the market factor, we see that
this has generated a mean return above 10% in the two sub-periods following 2003 Q3. For the
two preceding sub-periods, however, the mean return was 1.89% and 3.20%. We see that the
SMB factor generates the highest sub-period mean returns in the first and second sub periods.
Also, the mean return of the factor does not fall below zero for any of the sub-periods.
Results from the correlation matrix in Table 1 tell us that the correlation between the risk
factors is close to zero, except for the correlation between the market factor and SMB factor.
Here, we see a negative correlation of -0.45, telling us that when the market excess return is
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positive, the SMB factor return tends to be negative, and vice versa.
Table 1: This table presents statistics of the risk factors for five different periods: 1987-2019, 1987 Q1-
1995 Q1, 1995 Q2 - 2003 Q2, 2003 Q3 - 2011 Q3, and 2011 Q4 - 2019 Q4. Columns 2 and 3 contain the
annualized mean return and standard deviation for each factor, respectively. The maximum monthly
return in a given period is shown in column 4, whereas column 5 shows the lowest return in a given
period. All numbers are given in percent. Lastly, in panel F, a correlation matrix is given for the whole
sample period (1987-2019).
Mean Return Standard Dev. Max Min
Panel A: 1987 - 2019
MKT 7.09 20.74 16.51 -28.69
SMB 7.85 14.16 22.14 -17.08
HML 2.08 16.18 14.66 -16.65
PR1YR 8.67 16.31 15.43 -16.78
Panel B: 1987 Q1 - 1995 Q1
MKT 1.89 25.17 16.51 -28.69
SMB 8.36 17.53 22.14 -10.46
HML 14.15 19.55 14.66 -15.72
PR1YR -4.83 18.14 13.50 -16.78
Panel C: 1995 Q2 - 2003 Q2
MKT 3.20 20.24 11.81 -23.27
SMB 14.27 12.92 13.27 -17.08
HML -0.63 18.09 9.75 -16.65
PR1YR 9.23 18.54 15.43 -14.22
Panel D: 2003 Q3 - 2011 Q3
MKT 12.37 23.53 14.88 -24.58
SMB 5.14 14.94 12.82 -11.03
HML -2.07 13.95 9.10 -12.24
PR1YR 11.27 14.84 9.84 -16.09
Panel E: 2011 Q4 - 2019 Q4
MKT 10.91 11.37 9.96 -8.26
SMB 3.64 10.26 10.33 -7.42
HML -3.13 11.57 6.40 -7.42
PR1YR 19.03 12.38 12.05 -8.82
Panel F: Correlation Matrix 1987 - 2019
MKT SMB HML PR1YR
MKT 1
SMB -0.45 1
HML 0.05 -0.14 1
PR1YR -0.16 0.11 -0.11 1
4.5 Mutual Fund Returns: Potential Biases
Survivorship bias is one of the most obvious biases, which occurs if one omits funds that close
during the period of investigation (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, & Ross, 1992). Specifically,
the exclusion of terminated funds can lead to survivorship bias through sample selection.
Closed funds have implemented strategies that have been proven to fail. In exclusion of these
closed funds, the approach would also be eliminated (Elton et al., 1996). Funds are not
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primarily closed due to a poor one-year performance. More often, funds close due to multiple
years of underperformance (Carpenter & Lynch, 1999). If one included only the surviving
funds, one could see the sample average return being upward biased, due to the fact that funds
yielding a high return and persistently performing tend to be survivors. As the aggregate
performance becomes artificially inflated, it leaves the sample results incomplete.
Carpenter and Lynch (1999) also introduces a look-ahead bias, and they address the impor-
tance of year-end returns. Look-ahead bias can occur if funds are required to exist over a given
period, which would exclude funds with too short lifetimes. Funds are not necessarily closed
due to poor performance; one could argue that funds are closed due to the cost of operating
the fund surpassing the profits. However, this may come as a result of poor performance of the
fund. In order to prevent survivorship bias, both closed funds and funds still open are included
in the data set. The funds are required to have at least 12 observations to be included, thus
we might experience some look-ahead bias.
Note that Harvey and Liu (2020) argues that short return series may cause outliers in the
t-statistics of alpha through the bootstrapping procedure, which reduces the power of the test.
Therefore, the requirement of a minimum number of observations is a double-edged sword,
where look-ahead bias may occur with requirements of too many observations, but lowering
the requirements may reduce the power of the test. Fund size is not regarded in the restrictions,
all sizes are eligible for inclusion. In the case of merging funds, money is assumed to be invested
in the acquiring fund (Elton et al., 1996).
We look at the cumulative log-returns of the OSEAX, and equally weighted portfolios
consisting of: all funds available in a given month, all funds available in a given month that
are still open as of 31.12.2019, and all funds available in a given month that were closed prior to
31.12.2019. We see for the period as a whole, that the equally weighted portfolio of funds still
open as of 31.12.2019 has the highest cumulative log-return, presented in panel A of Figure 2.
Throughout the sub-periods, we also see that this portfolio generates the highest cumulative
return. However, we note that it was lower than the OSEAX in the years 2005-2009, as seen
in panel D Figure 2.
Looking at the equally weighted portfolio of all funds shown in Figure 2, we see that it
lies close to the cumulative log-return of the OSEAX. From the sub-periods plotted in panel
B-E, we see that the all-funds portfolio oscillates around the OSEAX cumulative log-return,
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but comes out marginally better at the end of the periods.
Finally, we look at the portfolio of funds that have been closed in Figure 2. We see that
this portfolio consistently generated a cumulative log-return below the other three return series
investigated. This finding tells us that the funds that have closed throughout the period might
have a downward effect on the aggregate return of funds to such a degree that the outperforming
funds are hidden by the bad returns of the funds closed.
Figure 2: The figure shows cumulative log-returns for OSEAX and three equally weighted portfolios
of funds: containing all funds, the funds alive as of 31.12.2019, and the funds who have been closed
throughout the whole sample period. Five periods are presented: the sample period as a whole, (1987-
2019), and four sub-periods of 8 years and a quarter spanning, 1987 Q1-1995 Q1, 1995 Q2 - 2003 Q2,
2003 Q3 - 2011 Q3, and 2011 Q4 - 2019 Q4. Presented in Panels A-E respectively.
Panel A: Jan. 1987. − Dec. 2019










Panel B: Jan. 1987. − Mar. 1995

















Panel C: Apr. 1995. − Jun. 2003



















Panel D: Jul. 2003. − Sep. 2011














Panel E: Oct. 2011. − Dec. 2019

















We also look at some descriptive statistics of the portfolios presented in Figure 2. Table 2
contains the mean return, standard deviation, skew, kurtosis, and the maximum and minimum
monthly return in a period. From the cumulative log-returns presented in Figure 2 we noted
that the portfolio of funds open as of 31.12.2019 had the highest cumulative return. The same
holds for the mean return of the portfolio for the given periods.
The standard deviation of the open funds portfolio is relatively high. As for higher mo-
ments, we see that we have some negative skew and excess kurtosis in relation to the normal
distribution. As noted in the discussion of the cumulative log-returns in Figure 2, we see that
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the portfolio of all funds and the OSEAX generated mean returns and standard deviations
that were close throughout the sub-periods. The standard deviation of the OSEAX and the
portfolio of all funds are close to each other for the periods. Both exhibit negative skew and
excess kurtosis in relation to the normal distribution.
Finally, the portfolio of funds that have been closed generated the lowest mean return
across all panels. In addition to having the highest standard deviation, we here, as in the other
cases, see negative skew and excess kurtosis.
Table 2: The table displays descriptive statistics of the OSEAX (the benchmark used in this thesis)
and for equally weighted portfolios of funds consisting of all funds available in a given period, all funds
available in a given period that is still open as of 31.12.2019, and lastly, all funds available in a given
period that closed prior to 31.12.2019. Five panels are presented, one for each time period under
investigation. That is, the sample period as a whole, 1987-2019, and four sub-periods, 1987 Q1-1995
Q1, 1995 Q2 - 2003 Q2, 2003 Q3 - 2011 Q3, and 2011 Q4 - 2019 Q4, in panel A-E, respectively. Four
moments of the return series are presented, mean return, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis
in columns 2-5, respectively. In addition, the maximum and minimum monthly returns are presented
in columns 7 and 8, respectively. Mean return and standard deviation are annualized and in percent,
whereas max- and min-returns are percentages.
Mean Return Std.Dev. Skew Kurtosis Max Min
Panel A: 1987 - 2019
OSEAX 12.38 20.62 5.84 -0.99 17.45 -27.42
All 12.60 20.63 5.11 -0.81 17.55 -25.28
Alive 13.71 20.81 5.04 -0.79 18.65 -25.39
Closed 10.83 20.89 5.15 -0.79 18.14 -25.09
Panel B: 1987 Q1 - 1995 Q1
OSEAX 12.63 3.65 4.71 -0.95 17.45 -27.42
All 13.03 3.76 3.39 -0.47 17.55 -19.56
Alive 14.38 4.15 3.27 -0.50 18.65 -17.03
Closed 12.02 3.47 3.74 -0.49 18.14 -21.48
Panel C: 1995 Q2 - 2003 Q2
OSEAX 9.09 2.63 4.87 -0.75 12.49 -22.57
All 8.87 2.56 4.28 -0.72 13.82 -22.83
Alive 10.96 3.17 4.26 -0.64 16.11 -23.12
Closed 7.08 2.04 4.31 -0.75 14.10 -22.64
Panel D: 2003 Q3 - 2011 Q3
OSEAX 15.53 4.48 5.27 -1.08 15.05 -23.93
All 15.33 4.43 5.26 -1.07 15.54 -25.28
Alive 15.87 4.58 5.31 -1.08 15.62 -25.39
Closed 14.58 4.21 5.20 -1.06 15.42 -25.09
Panel E: 2011 Q4 - 2019 Q4
OSEAX 12.26 3.54 3.74 -0.40 10.19 -8.10
All 13.16 3.80 4.51 -0.59 10.10 -9.36
Alive 13.62 3.93 4.59 -0.58 10.31 -9.34
Closed 9.65 2.79 4.15 -0.45 9.71 -9.39
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5 Empirical Results
This Section presents findings of the empirical analysis of Norwegian mutual fund performance.
First, aggregate and individual performance are investigated through the use of factor models.
Three factor models are presented: single-factor as in equation (1), the three-factor model from
equation (4), and the four-factor model as in equation (5).
The main focus is on the four-factor model, as this is applied in all bootstrapping proce-
dures, the other models are used for comparison. Next, bootstrap results in the Kosowski et al.
(2006) and Fama and French (2010) framework are examined to determine if we have evidence
of skilled or unskilled managers in our sample. Finally, we turn to the double-bootstrap results,
investigating whether funds are able to outperform the market net-of-fees.
5.1 Factor Model Fund Performance on Aggregate and Individual Levels
As a means of measuring the aggregate performance of the Norwegian mutual funds, an equally
weighted portfolio of the funds is created. That is, all funds alive in a given period are put
into a portfolio where each fund is given the same weight. Under the assumption of true alpha
being zero, the focus is on whether funds on aggregate have been able to yield a positive alpha.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions have been run in order to estimate factor coeffi-
cients and the abnormal performance of the equally weighted portfolio of funds. Table 3 shows
estimated results of regression analyses using the three factor models presented in this thesis.
This is conducted for the sample period as a whole, and four sub-periods of equal length: 8
years and one quarter.
Findings from the regression analysis tell us that the market factor has the highest impact
on the funds’ return, and a highly significant one at that. For all models and all time periods
where the models are applied, we see a statistically significant market coefficient. Adjusted
R-squared from the models tells us that the risk factors applied in the models explain between
88-96 percent of the variation in the aggregate fund returns.
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Table 3: This table shows estimated alpha, annualized and in percent, factor loadings, and adjusted
R-squared for an equally weighted portfolio of funds. All funds open in a given period are included
in the equally weighted portfolio. Single-factor-, three-factor-, and four-factor- estimates are provided
in rows 1-3 of each panel, respectively. Panel A provides full sample estimates whereas panel B-E
provides sub-sample estimates. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the estimate. Stars, *,
**, ***, represent statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Alpha and factor loadings
are presented in columns 2-5, whereas column 6 provides the adjusted R-squared of the model.
Model α βMKT βSMB βHML βPR1Y R R̄
2
Panel A: 1987-2019
Jensen’s 0.5 0.96*** 0.92
Single-factor (0.49) (67.10)
Fama-French -0.38 0.99*** 0.10*** -0.06*** 0.93
Three-factor (-0.37) (64.54) (4.34) (-3.39)
Carhart 0.04 0.99*** 0.10*** -0.07*** -0.04* 0.93
Four-factor (0.03) (64.13) (4.43) (-3.66) (-2.48)
Panel B: 1987-1995 first quarter
Jensen’s 0.69 0.87*** 0.89
Single-factor (0.26) (28.28)
Fama-French -1.20 0.89*** 0.11* 0.06 0.90
Three-factor (-0.44) (24.50) (2.36) (1.48)
Carhart -1.20 0.89*** 0.11* 0.06 0.00 0.90
four-factor (-0.44) (24.29) (2.35) (1.46) (0.04)
Panel C: 1995, 2nd Q-2003, 2nd Q
Jensen’s -0.45 1.07*** 0.94
Single-factor (-0.24) (38.52)
Fama-French -2.62 1.07*** 0.15*** -0.08* 0.95
Three-factor (-1.44) (40.08) (3.51) (-2.50)
Carhart -2.1 1.05*** 0.17*** -0.08** -0.08** 0.95
four-factor (-1.18) (38.88) (4.02) (-2.89) (-2.75)
Panel D: 2003, 3rd Q - 2011, 3rd Q
Jensen’s -0.15 1.0*** 0.96
Single-factor (-0.08) (45.76)
Fama-French -0.65 1.01*** 0.04 -0.07* 0.96
Three-factor (-0.36) (36.14) (0.97) (-1.87)
Carhart 0.13 1.03*** 0.08. -0.08* -0.10** 0.96
four-factor (0.07) (37.6) (1.81) (-2.16) (-3.01)
Panel E: 2011, 4th Q - 2019
Jensen’s 2.04 0.89*** 0.87
Single-factor (1.46) (26.04)
Fama-French 1.46 0.91*** 0.04 -0.09** 0.88
Three-factor (1.06) (25.01) (0.93) (-2.87)
Carhart 0.70 0.92*** 0.05 -0.09** 0.03 0.88
four-factor (0.44) (23.64) (1.13) (-2.87) (0.94)
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From the latest sub-period, 2011 Q4-2019 Q4, we see the highest annualized alpha esti-
mates, in addition to the lowest adjusted R-square in comparison to the other sub-periods. The
SMB factor, which is included in both the Fama-French three-factor model and Charharts four-
factor model, is statistically significant for the period as a whole and the first two sub-periods.
This tells us that the aggregate fund portfolio is impacted to a higher degree in the first part
of the sample period. The HML factor tells a slightly different story, being insignificant in
only the first sub-period, 1987-1995 Q1. Lastly, the momentum factor, PR1YR, included only
in the four-factor model, is significant for the sample period as a whole. The PR1YR factor is
non-significant only in two sub-periods.
To investigate the abnormal performance on the aggregate level, a plot of the evolvement of
alpha for the equally weighted fund portfolio is provided in Figure 3. Here, both extending and
rolling 36-month alpha is plotted, for both the Jensen’s alpha model and Charharts four-factor
model. In addition to the alpha estimate, standard error bands and Newey-West standard
error bands are plotted.
From the rolling Jensen’s alpha, panel A1, we see that the annualized alpha moves between
5% and -5%. The standard error bands move closer to the estimate itself throughout the
sample period, telling us that the variation in alpha is lower. In addition, the channel of the
standard error bands tells us about the trend of the alpha. If the channel is narrowing and
pointing upwards to the right, the alpha is in a strong trend upwards.
In the extending-window estimation of alpha starting at 36 months, however, we see that
the abnormal performance is barely below zero in the early ’90s. We also note that from
early 2000 up to 2019, the extending-alpha experiences less volatility, this can be seen by the
standard error bands narrowing, and by the decrease in movement in the estimate itself.
Inspection of the 36-month rolling-window of abnormal performance using the four-factor
model reveals that the abnormal performance is less volatile than the corresponding alpha of
the Jensen’s alpha model. A visual inspection of the rolling-alpha indicates that the estimate
moves in the interval of -5% to 5% throughout the period. Yet we find more observations at a
positive rolling alpha of 5% than -5%.
The extending-window of abnormal performance from the Carhart four-factor model tells
us a similar story to that of the Jensen’s alpha. The abnormal performance estimate volatility
reduces as more observations are put into the estimation sample. However, in application of
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the four-factor model, we see that the abnormal performance falls below 0 more frequently
when compared to the Jensen’s extending-window alpha.
Figure 3: The figure displays annualized 36 observation rolling-window alpha and extending-window
alpha, starting at 36 months. Alpha is given in percent (black). The alpha is estimated for an equally
weighted portfolio of the funds operating in a given month. Jensen’s alpha model is applied in panel A,
whereas panel B alpha is estimated through the use of the Charhart four-factor model. Standard error
bands (blue) and Newey-West standard error bands (red) are added to the plot for visualization of the
variation and trend in alpha.




























































































In Table 4 the top and bottom individual performers ranked on t-statistic of alpha is
presented. We see that individual funds are able to generate abnormal returns beyond covering
their fees for the investors. The top 7 performers generate statistically significant positive
abnormal returns. In addition, we note that the top 8th and 9th performers generates a
p-value of alpha below 0.1.
As for the bottom-performing funds, all generate statistically significant negative returns
net of fees at the 5% significance level. We also see that the bottom four funds generate a
p-value of 0.01 or below.
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Table 4: The table shows individual parametric estimates for the top 10 and bottom 10 funds ranked
on the t-statistic of alpha. Panel A presents the Top performers, along with the corresponding alpha
and p-value of alpha in the second and third row of the panel respectively. Panel B shows the individual
estimates of the bottom 10 performers t-statistic of alpha of the fund in the first row. The following
two rows present the estimated alpha and p-value corresponding to the t-statistic respectively.
Panel A: Top performers, ranked on t-statistic of alpha
Top 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
t-statistic 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.94 1.83 1.82 1.43 1.36 1.24
Alpha 3.02 10.95 5.38 3.78 3.26 1.95 7.62 6.18 1.60 4.18
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.11
Panel B: Bottom performers, ranked on t-statistic of alpha
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
t-statistic -3.22 -3.18 -2.96 -2.63 -2.45 -2.14 -2.03 -1.99 -1.89 -1.81
Alpha -12.25 -16.93 -5.31 -6.44 -4.28 -4.98 -3.32 -8.54 -19.06 -18.62
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Summarizing the results of the aggregate and individual fund performance findings suggest
that on aggregate, mutual funds are not able to generate statistically significant alpha different
from zero. As we are investigating the net-of-fees returns, this tells us that on aggregate funds
do not generate high enough returns to cover their costs on aggregate.
The individual fund performances measured through standard parametric OLS regression
tell us that the top performers are able to generate positive abnormal returns. Findings from
the bottom-performing funds tell us that these funds indeed generate returns significantly
below zero. From this, we gather that the top funds generate alpha large enough to add
value for investors after fees have been deducted. Bottom performers are, however, not able
to generate returns covering the cost of investing in these funds.
5.2 Kosowski et al. (2006) Approach, Luck or Skill?
We now turn our investigation into whether the performances observed are caused by luck
or skill. Kosowski et al. (2006) apply a baseline bootstrap where residuals are assumed to
be independently and identically distributed. In this thesis, however, the before-mentioned
argument of Politis and Romano (1994) is followed. Therefore, we use a block length of 4 in
the main bootstrapping procedure. That is, cross-sectional dependence in residuals is taken
into consideration.
Table 5 displays bootstrapped p-values of the Kosowski et al. (2006) method, using a block
length of four in the bootstrapping procedure. Panel A shows funds ranked on their alpha
estimate, whereas in Panel B, funds are ranked based on their t-statistic of alpha. Parametric,
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single-test p-values tell us that the top- and bottom performers are significantly outperforming
and underperforming the market. However, taking a look at the top performers ranked on
alpha, we see that these do not show any ability of stock-picking skill with a bootstrapped
p-value of 0.52.
According to the bootstrapped p-values of all the top performers inspected here, we see no
evidence of stock-picking skill. However, when looking at the bottom performers ranked on
alpha, bootstrapped p-values tell a different story. When the left tail performance is inspected,
we see evidence of a lack of skill in stock-picking. All five left tail performers considered in
Panel A provide significant evidence, with a bootstrapped p-value beneath 5% for all percentiles
presented.
Inspecting Panel B, where funds are ranked based on their t-statistic of alpha. We see that,
here as well, top funds fail to provide evidence of stock-picking skill, as opposed to luck. With
a bootstrapped p-value as high as 0.8 for the top-performing fund when ranked on t-statistic
of alpha, we cannot say that this performance is due to anything but luck.
When we however inspect the left tail performers when ranked on the t-statistic of alpha, we
see clear evidence of a lack of stock-picking skill among the worst Norwegian mutual fund man-
agers. All bottom performers considered here display significant evidence of underperformance
due to lack of skill bar the absolute bottom performer.
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Table 5: This table provides cross-sectional bootstrap results from the Kosowski et al. (2006) block
bootstrap method for all the Norwegian mutual funds in the sample 1987-2019. Both panels provide
findings for various percentiles of both top- and bottom performances. Panel A ranks funds based
on four-factor alpha and provides four-factor alpha estimates, along with bootstrapped p-values and
parametric p-values of the corresponding percentiles. Panel B shows and ranks performance on the
t-statistic of alpha, along with the bootstrapped p-value and parametric p-value. Columns 2-6 report
statistics of top funds, while columns 7-11 contain the bottom funds. The first rows in the two panels
reports estimated alpha and t-statistic of alpha, respectively. Row 2 and 3 contain bootstrapped p-
values and parametric p-values of the funds in both panels. The statistics are based on 10,000 bootstrap
resamples and ranked on their parametric t-statistic of alpha in both panels.
Top Top Bottom Bottom
Top 2.nd 3.rd 5% 10% 10% 5% 3.rd 2.nd Bottom
Panel A: Fund Ranked on Four-Factor Model Alpha
Alpha 10.95 7.62 6.18 5.38 3.02 -7.01 -11.89 -16.93 -18.62 -19.06
Bootstrapped p-value 0.52 0.08 0.57 0.29 0.80 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Parametric p-value 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.03
Panel B: Fund Ranked on t-statistic of Four-Factor Model Alpha
t-statistic 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.19 -1.73 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
Bootstrapped p-value 0.80 0.52 0.29 0.17 0.70 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.19
Parametric p-value 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
We would also like to inspect the cross-sectional distribution of the t-statistics of alpha,
in order to elaborate on the findings in Table 5. Figure 4 shows bootstrapped t-statistics of
alpha distributions for various percentiles. We compare the 10.000 bootstrapped t-statistics at
given percentiles in the top and bottom of performances, to the actual estimated t-statistic for
that same percentile in the actual t-statistic of alpha distribution. In addition to this, we also
present what the t-statistic of alpha had to be in order to generate a bootstrapped p-value of
5%, all else equal.
In Panel A, we see the top performer, fifth percentile, and tenth percentile, whereas Panel
B shows the left tail performance, e.g. bottom performer, bottom fifth percentile, and bottom
tenth percentile. For the top performer ranked by the t-statistic of alpha, presented in panel A1,
we see that the actual t-statistic lies to the left of the peak of the distribution of bootstrapped
t-statistic for that same percentile.
The actual t-statistic of alpha, and what it had to be in order to generate a bootstrapped
p-value of 5% all else equal, differs significantly from each other with an absolute difference of
1.47 (3.7 - 2.23). We note, as seen from the bootstrapped p-values from Table 5, that there are
a considerable amount of bootstrapped t-statistics generated that are larger than the actual
t-statistic of alpha for the top fund.
We also see that the bootstrapped t-statistics are left-skewed, and range from a little above
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1 to above 5 in the tails. This evidence further indicates that the returns generated by the
top-performing fund is due to luck rather than stock-picking skill. In panels A2 and A3, we see
less evidence of skew, and in addition a smaller range of the bootstrapped t-statistics. In panel
A2, the span ranges from just under 1 to approximately 3. Panel A3 displays a range between
approximately zero to just above 2. Yet, we find a considerable amount of bootstrapped t-
statistics above the actual t-statistic of alpha, confirming the results from the bootstrapped
p-values of these funds.
Panel B shows the left tail of funds ranked on the t-statistic of alpha. For the bottom fund
(Panel B1), we see a right skew in the density of the bootstrapped t-statistics, and a range
from above -5 to just under -1. The actual t-statistic of the bottom performer lies to the left
of the peak of the bootstrapped t-statistics of the bottom performer. However, we see that the
bootstrap procedure produces more t-statistics below the actual t-statistic of alpha than what
would warrant a rejection of the null hypothesis for the bottom performer.
From the other two panels, B2 and B3, we see that the actual t-statistics are located far out
in the tail of the bootstrapped t-statistics. The bootstrapped t-statistics here, as in panel A2
and A3, seem less skewed than the bottom percentile distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics.
With a narrower range and less extreme observations in the tails, we see that there is a very
small amount of bootstrapped t-statistics below the actual t-statistics at these percentiles.
In Figure 5, two panels are presented: The probability density function of both actual and
bootstrapped t-statistics in Panel A, and Panel B presents the cumulative distribution function
of the actual and bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha. When comparing the bootstrap generated
cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics of alpha to the actual cross-section of t-statistics of
alpha, we especially note the differences in the shape of the two distributions.
We see that the actual t-statistics of alpha exhibit a lower peak and fatter tails, especially
the left, and are more skewed to the left than the bootstrapped t-statistics. In addition, we see
a complicated feature in the distribution of the t-statistics of alpha: Two ”shoulders” around
zero. That is, we do not find the classical bell-shaped distribution. In an ideal world, where
we can reject the null of no abnormal performance among Norwegian mutual fund managers,
the distribution of actual t-statistics of alpha would lie to the right of the distribution of
bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha. This is, however, not the case here. Where actual t-
statistics of alpha is to the left of the bootstrapped t-statistic distribution. Indicating luck,
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Figure 4: The panels display various percentiles in the cross-section of the t-statistics of alpha. The
solid lines are the kernel densities of the bootstrapped four-factor t-statistics of alpha. The actual
estimated fund alpha is shown as the vertical dotted line. Panels A1-A3 present top performance
distributions for the top fund, top 5 percentile and top 10 percentile respectively. Panels B1-B3 report
left-tail performance for the bottom, bottom 5 percentile, and bottom 10 percentlie funds, respectively.
Statistics are based on 10,000 bootstrap resamples, and are ranked on the t-statistic of alpha in both
panels.
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rather than skill for top performing funds, and a lack of skill in the left tail.
The bootstrap offers the ability to deal with complex shapes of the full cross-sectional dis-
tribution of t-statistics. In addition, we are able to get more accurate measures on fat vs. thin
tails in the actual distribution through the use of bootstrapping. Finally, this results in differ-
ences between the inferences based on normality assumptions and the bootstrap procedure, as
a result of the lack of normality in the cross-sectional distribution of the actual t-statistics of
alpha for the funds.
We further elaborate on the results in Panel A with the cumulative probability function
of actual and bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha presented in Panel B. Panel B show us that
there is more probability mass in the left tail of the actual distribution in comparison to
the bootstrapped t-statistic distribution. We see that the cumulative distribution of actual
t-statistic lies above the bootstrapped t-statistics from about -3.2 up to 0.2. In the right tail,
we see that the actual t-statistic distribution dips below the bootstrapped distribution, but for
the main part it clings tightly to the bootstrapped cumulative distribution of t-statistics.
The distributions in Figure 5 tells us that the actual t-statistics of alpha are to the left of
the bootstrapped t-statistic distributions, which indicates an underperformance in relation to
the bootstrap. The evidence is also in line with prior findings from Table 5.
From parametric evidence, we have supporting findings of outperformance. However, when
conducting the bootstrap procedure as proposed by Kosowski et al. (2006), findings suggest
that superior performance is due to luck rather than stock-picking skill. Further, we have
found bootstrapped p-values for the bottom performers that are so low that we can support
the rejection of the null hypothesis. That is, the bootstrap evidence from this section tells us
that the underperformance is not due to bad luck alone, but suggests that underperformers
inhabit a lack of stock-picking skill.
From this analysis, we infer that the top-performing Norwegian mutual fund managers are
not skillful enough to generate abnormal returns beyond covering their fees. As for the Bottom
performers, we see that they in fact lack stock-picking skills. Meaning that these managers are
not skillful enough to cover their fees.
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Figure 5: The figure shows two panels illustrating the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative
density function (CDF) of the estimated and bootstrapped t-statistics. Panel A displays the PDF of
bootstrapped- (solid) and actual (dotted) t-statistic of alpha. Panel B shows the CDF of the actual
(dotted) and bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha (solid). Full sample four-factor estimates are used for
the actual t-statistics of alpha.
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5.3 Sensitivity Analysis Kosowski et al. (2006)
In the methodology of Kosowski et al. (2006), they apply multiple bootstrap procedures in
order to evaluate the robustness of their findings. In this sub-section, some of the robustness
tests conducted in the paper of Kosowski et al. (2006) are applied. When the bootstrapping
procedure is changed, specific assumptions may be affected and the null hypothesis may be
changed. Such changes and their effects will be addressed in the corresponding sections below.
5.3.1 Time-series dependencies
Politis and Romano (1994) argued that dependence in return residuals should be allowed
through adopting the stationary bootstrap method. The main bootstrap approach conducted
in this thesis keeps the dependence in return residuals. However, we here apply different lengths
of block-resampling.
When applying the stationary bootstrap method, it is essential to determine the block
length. The block length is determined through the asymptotic formula: lT̃
1
h , where T is
the number of observations, and h equals 3, 4, or 5. As argued by Hall, Horowitz, and Jing
(1995). In their study, they found that h depends on the context. In the context of one-sided
distribution functions for the given test statistic, the block bootstrap estimator is given as
h=4. For a two-sided distribution, Hall et al. (1995) argued that h = 5 and h = 3 should be
chosen when determining block bootstrap estimator variance. In the situation of this thesis,
this generated a block length of 4.
When applying this approach, blocks of random length are resampled and draws a string
of independent and identical random variables from a geometric distribution. This process
arranges the blocks to output a stationary pseudo-time-series. Results are compared under
different block lengths of 1, 4 (the block length used in the main investigation of the thesis),
and two random block lengths (2 and 10).
Results of the different block length bootstraps are presented in Appendix D. From the
results of the different block length procedures, we find minimal differences. Therefore, we
infer that the results are robust.
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5.3.2 Portfolios of Funds
Kosowski et al. (2006) argue that in order to determine whether individual cross-sectional fund
alpha analysis is affecting inference, one has to consider the corresponding average statistics
in each tail for portfolios of funds. This is conducted for the bootstrap procedure applied in
Section 5.2.
The test conducted here functions as a robustness check for the main results of the thesis.
In the application here, the null hypothesis is altered in order to account for portfolios, as
opposed to individual funds. The altered null hypothesis state: no abnormal returns (zero
alpha performance) across portfolios.
Funds are ranked individually based on the estimated t-statistic of alpha from the four-
factor model, before being bundled into portfolios consisting of 2, 3, and 5 funds. Portfolios
are bundled from the top, i.e., the top-performing portfolio consist of the two funds with the
highest estimated t-statistic of alpha, then the second top-performing portfolio consists of the
top 3rd and 4th funds when creating the portfolios of two funds. Alpha and t-statistic of alpha,
with both parametric and bootstrapped p-values, are presented in Appendix D, Table D.III.
5.3.3 Length of Data Records
As Harvey and Liu (2020) argue in their evaluation of the Fama and French (2010) error rates,
when too short time series are applied, this may significantly alter the results of bootstrapping
procedures. They argue that the short time-period requirements in Fama and French (2010)
were the main reason for the difference in results between that study and the results in Kosowski
et al. (2006). Kosowski et al. (2006) also argued for the use of longer series of returns, in that
they identified that short-lived funds tend to have a higher variation and volatility in alpha
estimates than that of long-lived funds.
In order to account for the fact that the length of series in the data set may affect the
results, requirements of a minimum of 24, 36, and 60 observations have been imposed. Using
these new panels of returns, the bootstrapping procedure is conducted once again. Note that
when we alter the length of the data records, the number of funds included in the sample
is reduced. Specifically, the number of funds in the minimum 24 observation sample is 98,
whereas for the minimum 36 and 60 observations samples, we have 96 and 82 funds included,
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respectively.
Results are reported in Table D.II, Appendix D, where we find minimal differences in the
results. Bottom performers provide statistically significant evidence, whereas we find no such
evidence for the top performers.
5.3.4 Bootstrap tests for Sub-Periods
In previous sections we have run the bootstrap approach for the time periods as a whole. This
section aims to evaluate whether results change when sub-periods are investigated. The funds
are still required to have a minimum of 12 observations in the given period in order to be
considered for the sample. The entire sample is divided into 4 sub-periods, each consisting of
8 years and one quarter. 1987- Mar. 1995, Apr. 1995 - Jun. 2003, Jul. 2003 - Sep. 2011,
finally, Oct. 2011 - Dec. 2019.
Results for each individual sub-period are reported in Table D.IV found in Appendix D,
divided into five panels. Panel A represent the full sample period, and panel B, C, D, and E
represent the four sub-periods, respectively.
The number of funds in each period varies from the full sample. In the first period, we have
19 funds in the sub-sample, whereas period 2 and 3 have 77 and 68 funds included, respectively.
Lastly, for the fourth sub-period we have 76 funds included. The findings for top performers
is in line with the results found in Table 5, where we do not reject the null hypothesis for
these funds. Also, the performances from the bottom funds in the sub-periods reject the null
hypothesis of no true performance. That is, these funds do not have sufficient skill in order to
cover costs, and cannot attribute the negative abnormal return to bad luck alone.
5.4 Fama & French (2010) Approach, Luck or Skill?
Bootstrap results from the Fama and French (2010) approach are presented in Table 6, in
addition to selected parametric estimates. The table is split into two panels, ranking the funds
on estimated alpha from the four-factor model in Panel A, and t-statistic of alpha in Panel
B. The key feature in these two panels is the difference between bootstrapped p-values and
parametric p-values.
The main difference between Table 6, presented here, and Table 5, from the Kosowski et al.
(2006) approach, is the bootstrapping procedure used to generate the bootstrapped t-statistics.
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The panels show statistics for various percentiles of the left and right tails in the distribu-
tions of alpha and t-statistic of alpha. Specifically, the top-performing fund is followed by the
second and third best, in addition to the top fifth and tenth percentile. Preceding the worst
performing fund are the tenth and fifth bottom percentiles, along with the second and third
bottom performers.
In panel A, the first row shows the estimated alpha, and the second and third rows contain
bootstrapped and parametric p-values, respectively. Panel B shows estimated t-statistics of
alpha in the first row, followed by (as in panel A), the corresponding bootstrapped p-values
and parametric p-values in rows 2 and 3 respectively. Inspecting Panel A, we find that the
top performing fund generates an annualized alpha of 10.95%, being statistically significant
in the parametric p-value evaluation. However, there is a stark difference with regards to the
bootstrapped p-value being 0.55, leading us to not reject the null hypothesis. Inspecting the
second and third top performers, we see a significant bootstrapped p-value, indicating that the
fund managers indeed have enough skill to warrant their fees and add value to investors. This
is a stark difference from the findings in Table 5, where the bootstrapped p-values of these
percentiles were too high to warrant rejection of the null hypothesis.
Taking a look at the bottom performers ranked on alpha, we find significant negative
alpha. In addition, when inspecting the corresponding bootstrapped p-value of the bottom
performers, we clearly reject the null hypothesis when ranking on alpha. This holds except for
the bottom performer, where the bootstrapped p-value suggests an insignificant value. These
findings correspond to the findings of Table 5. Moving on to panel B in the table shows us that
the top performers by no means generate abnormal returns warranting rejection of the null
hypothesis. That is, the null of fund managers being able to cover their costs holds. Again,
findings here correspond to the findings of applying the Kosowski et al. (2006) approach.
Inspecting the bottom performers tells a different story. The null hypothesis of fund man-
agers being skillful enough to cover their costs is clearly rejected at all percentiles considered.
Even at the bottom performing fund, contradicting the evidence from the Kosowski et al.
(2006) approach in Table 5 where the bottom performer had a bootstrapped p-value of 0.19.
This implicates that the Norwegian mutual fund managers do not show statistically signif-
icant evidence of generating returns beyond covering their cost. Inspecting the top performers
ranked on the t-statistic of alpha tells us that the generated returns of these funds clearly do
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not warrant rejection of the null. Contradicting the parametric p-value of the t-statistic of
alpha.
Table 6: This table provides cross-sectional bootstrap results of all the Norwegian mutual funds in the
sample 1987-2019, similar to Table 5, however, results are here based on applying the Fama and French
(2010) procedure. Both panels show findings for the same top/bottom performers and percentiles. Panel
A provides and ranks four-factor alpha estimates, along with bootstrapped p-values and parametric p-
values of the corresponding percentiles. Panel B reports and ranks performance on the t-statistic of
alpha, along with the bootstrapped p-values and parametric p-values. Columns, 1-5 report statistics
of top funds, while column 6-10 reports for the bottom funds. The first row in the two panels reports
estimated alpha and the t-statistic of alpha, respectively. Rows 2 and 3 report bootstrapped p-values
and the parametric p-values of the fund in both panels, respectively. Statistics are based on 10,000
bootstrap resamples and ranked on their t-statistic of alpha in both panels.
Top Top Bottom Bottom
Top 2nd 3rd 5% 10% 10% 5% 3rd 2nd Bottom
Panel A: Fund Ranked on Four-Factor Model Alpha
Alpha 10.95 7.62 6.18 5.38 3.02 -7.01 -11.89 -16.93 -18.62 -19.06
Bootstrapped p-value 0.55 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.97 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.78
Parametric p-value 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.03
Panel B: Fund Ranked on Four-Factor Model t-statistics
t-statistic 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.19 -1.73 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
Bootstrapped p-value 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Parametric p-value 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Through the application of the Fama and French (2010) method, we gather that outper-
forming funds are not skillful enough to generate returns above that of their fees. This rather,
is due to luck. The funds which have the lowest generated returns, however, generate returns
so low that they cannot be attributed to bad luck alone.
5.5 Harvey & Liu (2020) Double Bootstrap Approach
At the aggregate level, the previous section showed that the Norwegian mutual funds struggled
to generate significant positive alpha. Now, we will apply the test procedure proposed by
Harvey and Liu (2020), in order to draw further inference regarding the alpha generation of
funds.
Figure 6 reports the distribution of t-statistics for the funds in our sample in panel A. Panel
B present, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of the fund data for positive
t-statistic threshold. Finally, panel C presents the ROC curve of negative t-statistic thresholds
for the underperformers. Specifically, for a given number of p0 outperformers, the first-round
bootstrap classifies the funds into true outperformers and zero-alpha performers. Then, the
second round bootstrap is used to calculate the realized True Positive Rate (TPR) and False
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positive Rate (FPR) for each t-statistic cutoff, for each bootstrapped simulation.
The ROC curve is an intuitive diagnostics plot, which is used to assess the performance of
a classification method, e.g. a multiple-testing method (Harvey & Liu, 2020). Through the
ROC curve, one can highlight the trade-off between FPR and TPR for different assumed levels
of p0. The closer the ROC curve is to the North-West corner of the plot the better, when
investigating positive t-statistics, i.e., outperformance. That is, the closer a ROC curve is to
the North-West corner, the better will the corresponding cutoff t-statistic be at separating true
outperformance from false outperformance. The ROC curve is plotted for the two cases where
p0 = 10 and p0 = 20.
As for underperformance, the further the ROC is to the South-East corner, the better. As
the ideal would be a true positive rate of 1 and a false positive rate of 0. A 45-degree line has
also been drawn through the plot, representing random classification.
We run I = 100 first-round bootstraps and J = 10.000 second round bootstraps, totaling
1.000.000 bootstraps for each fund. Lastly, we calculate the average TPR and FPR across
simulations. The TPR is defined as the number of true rejections over the total number of
true outperformers. The FPR is defined as the fraction of false rejections of the null to the
total number of zero-alpha performers.
From Figure 6 Panel A, we see from the histogram that the distribution of actual t-statistics
is skewed to the left, and we observe more t-statistics bellow -2 ( 6.5%) than above 2 ( 2.8%).
Panel B shows us that the ROC curve of p0 = 10 outperformers is closer to the North-West
corner than the ROC curve for p0 = 20. This is due to the fact that a smaller p0 corresponds
to a more select group, e.g., a higher average t-statistic for the outperformers and vice versa
for underperformers. Finally, Panel C presents the ROC curve for p0 = 10 and p0 = 20
underperformers. We note that the ROC curves are drawn further to the South-East corner
than the respective ROC curves are drawn to the North-West corner for outperformers in panel
B. This indicates a higher signal-to-noise ratio for underperformers.
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Figure 6: The figure presents both a t-statistic distribution (Panel A) and the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve for both outperformers (Panel B) and underperformers (Panel C). Note
that in the underperforming ROC curve plot, Panel C, the axis have been flipped. Using the Charhart
four-factor model, t-statistics of alpha are estimated. The red lines (dashed) in Panel A represent
t-statistics of -2 and 2. Points on the ROC curves correspond to a t-statistic of 2 in panel B, for
outperformers, and -2 in Panel C, for underperformers.
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We next investigate how the error rates change as we vary the cutoff t-statistic for a given
number of p0 out- and underperformers. We here compare the second round bootstrapped
t-statistics, where we know which funds are generating abnormal performance, and which are
generating zero-alpha performance. Through the use of equation (13) and equation (14), error
rates are calculated. The Oratio is calculated as in equation (15). This is done for each cutoff
t-statistic between 1.5 and 6 with 0.01 increments for outperformance, and between -1.5 and
-6 with -0.01 increments for underperformance.
In Figure 7, Panel A shows Type I and Type II error rates, in addition to the odds ratio
for the range of cutoff t-statistics for different levels of p0: namely 0, 5, 10, and 20 funds
outperforming. We see that the Type I error rate decreases as the statistical threshold increases
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in the panels A1-A4, for outperformers. However, as the Type I error rate decreases, the Type
II error rate increases. This is the classical trade-off between Type I and Type II error rates
extended to the multiple test. However, the increase in the Type II error rate is marginal when
the cutoff t-statistic is increased. That is, the probability of failing to reject the null when the
alternative is true remains relatively low.
The cutoff t-statistic corresponding to a Type I error rate of 5% is shown as the vertical lines
in the plots. We note that the threshold t-statistic decreases as the number of outperformers
increase. This follows from the fact that a higher number of true outperformers calls for a more
lenient t-statistic threshold, in order to correctly reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal
performance for the fund when more funds assumed to outperform.
In panels B1-B4, displaying error rates as a function of cutoff t-statistics for underperform-
ers, we see the same pattern as for the outperformers in panels A1-A4. Note however that, as
the statistical threshold decreases, the Type I error rate decreases. Further, the Type II error
rate increases as the cutoff t-statistics are decreasing. The classic relationship between Type I
and Type II error rates is shown once again. When the Type I error rate decreases, the Type
II error rate increases.
In absolute values, we see that the cutoff t-statistics corresponding to a Type I error rate of
5% is very close between the outperformers and underperformers. However, we note that the
Type II error rate is higher for the cutoff t-statistics measuring underperformance. Meaning
that there is a greater possibility for a true underperforming fund manager not being detected
than for a true outperformer not being detected.
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Figure 7: The figure presents simulated error rates for both positive and negative t-statistics. Panel A
show the simulated Type I (black) and Type II (red) error rates, and in addition odds ratio (blue) for
a series of threshold t-statistics, ranging from 1.5 to 6.0 with 0.01 increments. This is conducted for
p0 = 0, 5, 10, and 20. Panel B show the simulated Type I and Type II error rates of t-statistic thresholds
of -1.5 to -6 with increments of -0.01. For each threshold t-statistic, the Type I and Type II error rate is
calculated for each p0 = 0, 5, 10, and 20, number of assumed underperformers. In each panel, the cutoff
t-statistic corresponding to a Type I error rate of 5% is represented by the vertical dashed line. Error
rates are calculated based on I = 100 first-round bootstraps and J = 10, 000 second-round bootstraps.

































































































































In Figure 8, we again see the pattern where the cutoff t-statistic corresponding to a Type I
error rate of 5% decreases as the number of outperformers increase. From the plot, we can take
away the fact that if one believes that zero outperforming funds are true, then the threshold
t-statistic for the fund to overcome in order to reject the null hypothesis is 5.9 (if one wishes
to control the Type I error rate to be 5%). Moving along the line, at p0 = 5, we find a cutoff
t-statistic of 3.23 giving the Type I error of 5%. Finally, for the highest assumed number of
outperformers, we see that a t-statistic threshold of 2.88 would correspond to a 5% Type I
error rate.
Inspecting the underperformers present a similar picture as for the outperformers. The
threshold statistic starts out close to -6, and goes towards -2 as the number of underperformers
increases. In the case where we have no true underperformers assumed, a threshold t-statistic
of -5.95 suffices to hold the Type I error rate to the 5% level. The curve goes steeply upward
to a cutoff t-statistic of -3.65 in the case of one true underperformer. Moving on along the
spectrum of underperformers, the line gets less steep the more true underperformers there are
assumed to be. For an assumed level of p0 = 10 underperformers, we see a cutoff t-statistic of
-3.0. Increasing the number of true underperformers up to 20 results in a cutoff t-statistic of
-2.75, which is smaller in absolute terms than for the outperformers.
We can employ the findings in Figures 7 and 8 in the following manner: If one believes that
the true number of outperforming funds is indeed 20, then, according to the findings in Figure
8 we should employ the statistical threshold of 2.88. In doing this, we know that there is only
a 5% chance of picking a fund where the null is rejected that is actually not an outperformer.
From Figure 7 we can draw the same conclusion, and we can also incorporate the cost of a
Type I and a Type II error.
If one believes that the true number of outperformers is 10, and one may be willing to
accept a Type I error that is higher than the usual level of 5%, say a 20% Type I error rate.
That is, in the rejection of the null for 5 funds, one would expect one of these to be a zero-
abnormal return performer. This is exactly the point of the proposed odds ratio, expressing the
possibility of the outperformer being a true outperformer or not. Still, one is able to identify
outperformers that may yield a return high enough to cover the cost of a zero alpha performer.
Table 7 shows cutoff t-statistics for different numbers of assumed out- and underperformers
yielding an empirical Type I error rate of maximum 0.05 from the double bootstrap approach.
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Figure 8: The figure presents cutoff t-statistics at a Type I error rate of 5%, as a function of p0
out- and underperformers. The figure on top shows positive cutoff t-statistics for the p0 assumed
outperformers. The bottom figure shows the negative cutoff t-statistics corresponding to the p0 assumed
underperformers. The classical threshold t-statistic of 2 and -2 in hypothesis testing is shown by the
horizontal (dashed) line in each plot respectively.

























































The corresponding Type II error rate is also presented, along with the number of rejections
from the funds under consideration. From Panel A, we see that the cutoff t-statistic for p0 = 5
is 3.23. The corresponding Type II error to this cutoff is 0.03, indicating that if we apply this
cutoff, believing that 5 funds are truly outperforming, that the chance of falsely not declaring
a true outperformer as outperforming is low. This gives a test power of 0.97 (= 1-0.03) in the
Harvey and Liu (2020) framework.
We note that for the assumed levels of p0 = 10 and p0 = 20, the corresponding Type II
error is above the 5% level that one usually wants in a hypothesis test. For instance, if we
assume p0 = 20 is true, then applying the 2.88 t-statistic threshold, we run the risk of not
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true in 15% of the cases. We do, however, see
that using the statistical thresholds providing a Type I error rate of 5% for the right tail of
the distribution yields zero rejections of the null for the funds in the sample.
From Panel B, showing the cutoff t-statistics for the left tail of the distribution, we see
levels of the Type II error rate below 5% for the p0 = 0top010 underperformers, for the p0 = 20
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assumed underperformers, we find that the Type II error rate is at 11% when using a threshold
t-statistic of -2.75. We do, however, for the underperformers, reject the null hypothesis in two
occasions: when the assumed number of underperformers is 10, and when it is 20.
Finally, and most importantly, we note the last column in Table 7. The power of the tests
conducted using the cutoff t-statistics. From calculating the Type II error rate in the usual
way, as opposed to the Type II error rate calculation of Harvey and Liu (2020), we see that
the test power is in fact very low. From this, we can conclude that the test would frequently
fail to reject the null where the alternative is actually true.
Table 7: This table presents cutoff t-statistics for different values of p0 out- and underperformers
where the Type I error rate is required to be 5%. The first column shows the assumed number of
outperformers and underperformers. Column 2 contain the cutoff t-statistic for the assumed number
of out- and underperformers. The corresponding Type I, Type II error rates, and odds ratio are given
in columns 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Column 6 shows the number of rejections of the null hypothesis
for in the sample used. Finally, column 7 displays test power calculated using the usual and most
frequent method of calculating Type II error rate in multiple tests. Panel A presents cutoff t-statistics
for outperformers, whereas Panel B contains cutoff t-statistics for underperformers.
p0 Cutoff Type I Type II Odds ratio n. rejections Test Power
Panel A: Outperformers
0 5.58 0.05 0.01 0 0 0.09
1 3.55 0.05 0.00 0.03 0 0.51
5 3.23 0.05 0.03 0.05 0 0.42
10 3.08 0.05 0.06 0.03 0 0.34
20 2.88 0.05 0.15 0.02 0 0.25
Panel B: Underperformers
0 -5.95 0.05 0.01 0 0 0.10
1 -3.65 0.05 0.00 0.03 0 0.63
5 -3.25 0.05 0.02 0.09 0 0.59
10 -3.00 0.05 0.05 0.07 2 0.53
20 -2.75 0.05 0.11 0.04 3 0.44
From the analysis conducted using the proposed Harvey and Liu (2020) methodology, we
find no evidence of top performers being skillful enough to generate abnormal returns net of
fees for their customers. For the bottom performers, we find some evidence when the assumed
number of underperformers is high. However, when calculating the Type II error rate for
multiple test in the usual way, we see that the test power is too low. As such, we cannot rely
on the results too heavily.
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6 Conclusion
This thesis investigates whether Norwegian mutual fund managers are able to generate abnor-
mal returns for their investors and whether this is due to skill or luck. We study 107 funds
operating in the period 1987-2019, gathered from the TITLON database reporting net-of-fees
returns for a sample free of survivorship bias. The four-factor model proposed by Carhart
(1997) is applied as the primary performance model, both at aggregate and individual fund
levels.
The bootstrapping approaches of Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French (2010), and
Harvey and Liu (2020) have been applied, in order to distinguish between luck and skill. We
take into consideration the Type I and Type II error rates in a multiple test. In addition, the
bootstrap procedure of Kosowski et al. (2006) has been further applied in the evaluation of
statistical significance through sensitivity analysis.
From aggregate fund performance results, we can conclude that Norwegian mutual fund
managers on aggregate produce a net-of-fees non-significant annualized alpha of 0.04%. More
specifically, this tells us that investors in the funds on aggregate do not receive a return after
fees warranting the use of active management as opposed to passive index fund investments.
This is in line with findings from other Scandinavian countries, as evident from the findings of
Christensen (2013), Flam and Vestman (2017), and Korkeamaki and Smythe Jr. (2004). Neu-
tral Aggregate fund performance is not a phenomena found only in Scandinavia. Researchers
as early as Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) concluded that active management was simply
not worth the additional fees.
Individual fund parametric OLS regressions, tell us that funds indeed generate both positive-
and negative significant abnormal returns. This however, holds true only amongst the top 7
funds, out of the 45 funds generating positive alpha ranked on the t-statistic of alpha in the
sample. Whereas, the bottom 13 mutual funds ranked on the t-statistic of alpha out of the 62
funds generating negative alpha in the sample, have significant negative alpha at the 5% level.
In addition, the bottom performers produce more extreme negative t-statistics than what we
experience with the top performing funds. Indicating that the bottom performers drag the
aggregate performance of the mutual funds down more than the outperformers are able to
contribute with. Sharpe (1966) also found evidence of this among US mutual funds in the
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early stages of mutual fund performance evaluation. From the Swedish mutual fund market,
Dahlquist et al. (2000) found that mutual funds indeed outperformed the market.
Further, stock-picking skill has been investigated through the use of the Kosowski et al.
(2006) approach. Findings present minimal significant evidence of stock-picking skill amongst
the 107 mutual funds investigated. Only in the application of the Fama and French (2010)
approach, we find minimal evidence of outperformance when ranking funds on alpha. However,
a lack of stock-picking skill is found amongst the fund managers generating the lowest abnormal
returns net of fees. These findings contradict the findings of Gallefoss et al. (2015) in the
Norwegian mutual fund market, in that they found stock picking skill amongst the mutual fund
managers. Sørensen (2009) found no evidence of skill amongst the top performing Norwegian
mutual funds in his study. However, the findings of this thesis and the studies of Gallefoss
et al. (2015) and Sørensen (2009) all point to a lack of skill amongst the bottom performing
mutual fund managers in Norway.
From the next applied approach of Fama and French (2010), in investigations of skill for
the mutual funds. The adjusted bootstrap method applied, tells us that the null hypothesis
of abnormal returns being due to luck is rejected. That is, conducting the same procedure
as Sørensen (2009) in his investigation of Norwegian mutual funds, we find similar evidence
for the sample used in this thesis, being of a longer time period than that investigated by
Sørensen (2009). We do, however, find a glimmer of evidence in stock-picking skill among
the top performing funds when calculating bootstrapped p-values and ranking funds based on
alpha. Whereas bottom performing funds are not merely unlucky, they have a lack in stock-
picking skills. Similar findings was presented by Flam and Vestman (2017) in his investigation
in the Swedish mutual fund market. Additionally, Fama and French (2010) found no evidence
of stock-picking skill in the US. mutual fund market among the top performing funds. Rather,
they found, as seem evident from most studies conducting these bootstrapping procedures in
investigation of mutual funds that the bottom performing funds had a lack of stock picking
skill in order to cover their costs.
Through the double bootstrap approach of Harvey and Liu (2020) we find no evidence of
skill amongst the top performing Norwegian mutual fund managers. Meaning that their abnor-
mal return is due to luck rather than skill. When assuming a high amount of underperformers
amongst the Norwegian mutual fund managers, cutoff t-statistics corresponding to a Type I
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error rate of 5% leads us to reject the null hypothesis for some bottom performers. Indicating
that if the true number of underperformers is 20, then 3 of the managers in the sample have
a lack of stock-picking skill in order to cover their cost. These findings are in line with the
findings of Fama and French (2010) in their study of the US mutual fund market, where, as
mentioned, the top performing mutual funds where not found to have stock-picking skill. We
also contradict, as Fama and French (2010), the findings of Kosowski et al. (2006) in the US
mutual fund market. Where the top performing funds where found to have stock picking skill.
In summary, all three approaches applied in the investigation of skill vs luck among the
Norwegian mutual fund managers yield the same result. Stock-picking skill is not found among
the top performing funds. There is as mentioned a glimmer of hope from the Fama and French
(2010) where the second and third top, along with the fifth percentile performers generate
bootstrapped t-statistics statistically significant. However, we cannot conclude that the fund
managers exhibit stock-picking skill based on these results alone. Rather, with respect to
the findings in this thesis as a whole. Performances is attributed to luck. For the bottom
performers, we find, however, evidence of a lack of skill in all three approaches.
We must however express the power of the tests conducted here. Through the critique of
Harvey and Liu (2020) we know that the test power is low for the bootstrapping procedures of
Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010). In addition, when calculating the Type
II error rate in the most usually applied way for multiple tests, we see that the power of the
cutoff t-statistic methodology of Harvey and Liu (2020) is also too low. This implicates that
the tests we apply in the investigation of skill vs. luck in mutual fund performance are not
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Appendix A
Table A.I: The table presents the number of observations we have for each fund in column 2. Further,
annualized mean return is displayed in column 3 and standard deviation is shown in column 4. The
third and fourth moments, kurtosis and skew, for each funds net returns is presented in column 5 and
6, respectively. Lastly, the maximum and minimum monthly net return is presented in the penultimate
and rightmost columns, respectively
Fund Obs Mean Std.dev Kurtosis Skewness Max Min
ABIF Norge ++ 56 8.02 23.41 2.53 -0.31 13.53 -16.25
Alfred Berg Aksjef Norge 115 10.36 21.14 4.88 -0.77 13.06 -24.97
Alfred Berg Aksjespar 106 9.30 22.90 5.17 -0.87 13.34 -27.99
Alfred Berg Aktiv 289 14.11 22.62 5.59 -0.77 21.08 -27.05
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 182 9.27 25.30 4.23 -0.60 17.89 -27.37
Alfred Berg Gambak 350 15.25 22.68 5.69 -0.40 28.50 -27.38
Alfred Berg Humanfond 241 10.40 20.27 6.04 -0.97 16.12 -25.88
Alfred Berg N. Pensjon 52 13.14 21.02 7.56 -1.36 11.91 -24.80
Alfred Berg Norge 147 10.62 24.59 4.90 -0.96 17.10 -27.01
Alfred Berg Norge + gml 197 11.07 23.57 5.23 -0.97 17.13 -26.91
Alfred Berg Norge Classic 351 10.70 20.99 6.04 -1.06 17.10 -27.01
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk 146 11.83 23.99 5.58 -1.04 16.65 -27.84
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 72 12.12 9.64 4.26 -0.95 6.81 -7.98
Alfred Berg Vekst 72 8.89 26.53 4.89 -0.51 19.33 -27.82
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class A 109 9.52 11.36 4.51 -0.67 9.49 -9.26
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class B 110 10.02 12.01 4.44 -0.57 9.79 -9.20
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class D 83 11.79 9.41 4.55 -0.92 7.11 -8.51
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class I 110 10.10 11.92 4.41 -0.58 9.65 -9.19
Atlas Norge 263 10.53 24.20 6.67 -0.09 36.85 -25.25
Banco Norge 38 13.25 24.05 2.73 -0.33 13.89 -17.12
C WorldWide Norge 294 13.40 20.51 6.07 -0.89 19.80 -27.52
Carnegie Aksje Norge 210 14.47 23.37 5.06 -0.86 19.80 -27.52
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesf. A 21 16.69 15.54 3.59 -0.83 7.59 -10.67
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 237 11.94 19.51 5.69 -0.93 15.46 -22.85
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 158 10.30 18.72 7.29 -1.16 15.04 -22.73
Danske Invest Norge I 312 11.17 20.09 6.63 -1.03 14.85 -28.80
Danske Invest Norge II 312 11.95 20.18 6.64 -1.02 14.91 -29.49
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 312 15.34 22.27 9.61 0.33 41.77 -25.68
Delphi Norge 307 15.13 23.39 5.07 -0.54 23.01 -24.93
Delphi Vekst 193 11.02 26.07 4.03 -0.33 25.54 -23.04
DNB Norge 289 9.30 20.10 5.38 -0.84 15.81 -24.12
DNB Norge (Avanse I) 327 10.90 21.89 5.10 -0.96 15.96 -26.42
DNB Norge (Avanse II) 287 9.65 21.57 5.39 -0.96 16.05 -26.40
DNB Norge (I) 295 11.48 24.59 18.28 1.31 59.30 -24.16
DNB Norge (III) 283 10.72 20.25 5.37 -0.87 15.87 -24.17
DNB Norge (IV) 206 13.95 19.48 5.95 -0.89 15.97 -24.24
DNB Norge R 12 15.86 9.99 3.70 -1.20 4.48 -5.54
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 214 11.99 20.04 5.37 -0.77 16.85 -23.74
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) 307 11.44 20.05 5.22 -0.82 16.99 -24.07
DnB Real-Vekst 157 6.14 30.41 27.68 2.15 68.90 -40.26
DNB SMB 226 14.13 23.76 4.17 -0.47 17.48 -26.49
Eika Norge 196 14.43 19.27 6.96 -1.02 18.40 -24.93
Eika SMB 187 8.34 23.44 4.28 -0.67 17.06 -22.94
FIRST Generator 112 13.14 19.55 4.41 -0.77 15.51 -18.90
FIRST Norge Fokus 14 11.50 10.02 3.70 -0.99 5.22 -6.09
Fokus Barnespar 32 -0.65 27.06 6.44 -1.21 12.75 -28.09
Fondsfinans Aktiv II 48 -0.60 23.15 2.93 -0.23 14.34 -16.48
Fondsfinans Norge 205 16.90 20.17 5.66 -0.78 16.32 -25.73
FORTE Norge 107 10.00 14.50 4.05 -0.08 14.49 -11.60
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Fund Obs Mean Std.dev Kurtosis Skewness Max Min
FORTE Trønder 81 16.37 11.97 3.27 -0.14 9.46 -8.80
GAMBAK Oppkjøp 19 3.50 19.03 3.48 0.35 13.94 -9.16
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar 152 10.54 22.73 5.18 -0.94 16.59 -26.70
GJENSIDIGE Invest 104 15.24 20.35 5.39 -0.85 13.34 -21.18
Globus Aktiv 88 15.14 29.39 3.35 -0.30 23.56 -22.63
Globus Norge 103 7.71 29.32 3.38 -0.35 22.34 -23.36
Globus Norge II 95 11.98 28.55 3.40 -0.24 23.12 -22.91
Handelsbanken Norge 300 12.34 20.67 7.08 -1.17 17.75 -28.82
Handelsbanken Norge A10 18 3.12 12.61 3.52 -1.18 4.93 -8.50
Holberg Norge 229 11.86 19.79 4.70 -0.52 15.94 -23.90
K-IPA Aksjefond 37 11.49 22.96 5.08 -0.97 12.32 -21.75
KLP Aksjeinvest 97 5.38 21.14 4.67 -0.78 14.92 -22.21
KLP AksjeNorge 250 11.52 20.36 6.24 -0.91 17.59 -29.77
Landkreditt Norge 122 7.14 20.38 5.14 -0.74 17.13 -20.70
Landkreditt Utbytte 83 13.84 7.31 3.44 -0.76 4.65 -4.68
Landkreditt Utbytte I 19 10.44 7.35 2.71 -0.39 4.21 -3.82
NB-Aksjefond 207 9.97 22.50 5.14 -0.94 18.24 -24.78
Nordea Avkastning 396 11.81 21.95 5.70 -0.87 20.68 -27.57
Nordea Barnespar 47 -2.20 21.16 2.68 -0.36 11.38 -16.35
Nordea Kapital 298 12.70 20.23 5.92 -1.01 16.70 -25.72
Nordea Kapital II 84 14.40 22.67 2.80 -0.47 13.37 -17.50
Nordea Kapital III 70 12.74 23.25 2.75 -0.56 13.33 -17.46
Nordea Norge Pluss 105 10.10 13.32 4.17 -0.65 12.10 -11.09
Nordea Norge Verdi 287 12.47 18.99 5.66 -0.87 15.17 -24.46
Nordea SMB 213 6.80 23.64 3.54 -0.23 18.26 -23.23
Nordea SMB II 70 -13.70 26.47 3.13 0.17 18.70 -19.14
Nordea Vekst 337 10.62 23.00 4.85 -0.85 19.50 -26.22
ODIN Norge 331 15.35 20.88 5.42 -0.43 22.78 -24.09
ODIN Norge A 50 10.85 9.76 4.55 -1.19 4.69 -8.58
ODIN Norge B 50 10.60 9.78 4.56 -1.20 4.66 -8.63
ODIN Norge D 50 10.61 9.77 4.56 -1.20 4.67 -8.61
ODIN Norge II 139 12.24 19.43 6.11 -0.99 13.59 -23.98
Orkla Finans 30 162 18.56 21.83 4.48 -0.71 14.70 -26.16
Pareto Aksje Norge 220 13.62 18.55 6.53 -0.84 16.11 -26.09
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforval) 277 11.29 20.58 5.32 -0.72 17.56 -25.51
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv) 300 11.75 19.46 6.21 -0.98 15.95 -25.03
Postbanken Aksjevekst 97 7.37 23.68 3.15 -0.40 14.84 -19.72
RF Aksjefond 116 10.31 21.45 4.27 -0.73 13.50 -23.83
RF-Plussfond 54 16.89 24.89 2.47 -0.36 14.45 -17.05
Sbanken Framgang Sammen 47 12.73 9.46 3.81 -0.73 6.72 -7.18
SEB Norge LU 67 -4.99 25.29 4.24 -0.65 15.62 -26.07
Skandia Horisont 97 11.63 22.30 4.13 -0.76 16.23 -21.52
Skandia SMB Norge 97 0.71 23.81 5.44 -1.01 13.83 -27.32
SR-Bank Norge A 12 16.50 10.17 2.50 -0.49 5.24 -4.64
SR-Bank Norge B 12 16.50 10.16 2.50 -0.49 5.24 -4.64
Storebrand Aksje Innland 282 11.33 20.13 6.08 -1.02 15.39 -26.50
Storebrand AksjeSpar 226 6.75 15.06 4.30 -0.89 10.32 -14.04
Storebrand Norge 396 12.76 21.54 5.48 -0.89 17.30 -28.83
Storebrand Norge A 43 23.16 24.49 2.76 -0.52 14.64 -17.17
Storebrand Norge Fossilfri 33 11.18 7.01 4.35 -0.89 4.51 -5.34
Storebrand Norge I 237 11.35 20.56 6.21 -1.00 14.85 -28.59
Storebrand Norge Institusjon 39 8.48 14.62 3.65 -0.53 9.89 -9.72
Storebrand Optima Norge 221 11.84 21.07 6.04 -0.99 14.59 -29.29
Storebrand Vekst 328 15.77 24.02 6.70 0.01 36.71 -30.06
Storebrand Verdi 265 11.05 20.03 6.18 -0.97 13.50 -26.53
Storebrand Verdi N 22 7.06 10.48 2.85 -0.53 5.92 -5.55
Terra Norge 187 9.47 24.69 4.46 -0.75 18.81 -26.20
VÅR Aksjefond 39 8.57 24.43 6.49 -1.19 11.46 -26.08
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Table A.II: This table presents factor loadings of the Charhart four-factor model and adjusted R2 for
each individual fund. OLS regression has been run in order to estimate the factor loadings, where the
full period of a funds return series has been utilized. Columns 2 to 5 present factor loadings, whereas
column 6 present the adjusted R2 for the net excess return of the fund.
Fund βMKT βSMB βHML βPR1Y R adj − R2
ABIF Norge ++ 1.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 0.96
Alfred Berg Aksjef Norge 1.01 0.07 -0.00 -0.04 0.95
Alfred Berg Aksjespar 1.07 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.92
Alfred Berg Aktiv 1.14 0.27 -0.18 0.03 0.86
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 1.09 0.31 -0.18 -0.06 0.87
Alfred Berg Gambak 1.10 0.31 -0.27 0.11 0.80
Alfred Berg Humanfond 0.99 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 0.91
Alfred Berg N. Pensjon 1.07 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.93
Alfred Berg Norge 1.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.09 0.95
Alfred Berg Norge + gml 1.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.95
Alfred Berg Norge Classic 1.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.94
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk 1.05 0.03 -0.16 -0.14 0.94
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 0.84 -0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.84
Alfred Berg Vekst 1.16 0.31 -0.11 0.16 0.80
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class A 0.84 0.05 -0.10 0.17 0.75
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class B 0.92 0.06 -0.10 0.18 0.80
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class D 0.82 0.03 -0.08 0.18 0.76
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class I 0.92 0.06 -0.10 0.18 0.80
Atlas Norge 1.13 0.14 -0.27 -0.02 0.85
Banco Norge 1.05 0.13 -0.18 -0.19 0.92
C WorldWide Norge 1.01 -0.02 -0.16 0.03 0.92
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1.02 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.93
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesf. A 0.78 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.69
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 0.96 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.92
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 0.96 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.91
Danske Invest Norge I 0.99 0.00 -0.05 -0.10 0.90
Danske Invest Norge II 1.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.91
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 1.09 0.41 -0.23 0.02 0.77
Delphi Norge 1.16 0.30 -0.23 -0.03 0.84
Delphi Vekst 1.11 0.37 -0.29 -0.09 0.84
DNB Norge 1.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.96
DNB Norge (Avanse I) 0.94 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.92
DNB Norge (Avanse II) 0.98 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.94
DNB Norge (I) 1.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.74
DNB Norge (III) 1.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.96
DNB Norge (IV) 1.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.96
DNB Norge R 0.86 0.33 0.12 -0.14 0.93
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 1.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.95
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) 1.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.94
DnB Real-Vekst 0.99 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.46
DNB SMB 1.19 0.47 -0.12 -0.19 0.79
Eika Norge 1.03 0.13 -0.04 -0.10 0.89
Eika SMB 0.99 0.18 -0.04 -0.22 0.85
FIRST Generator 1.46 0.33 -0.07 0.00 0.73
FIRST Norge Fokus 0.73 -0.33 -0.19 -0.03 0.77
Fokus Barnespar 0.97 0.04 -0.02 -0.27 0.83
Fondsfinans Aktiv II 0.96 -0.07 -0.00 -0.17 0.90
Fondsfinans Norge 1.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.12 0.87
FORTE Norge 1.06 0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.70
FORTE Trønder 0.80 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.47
GAMBAK Oppkjøp 0.49 0.26 -0.14 0.41 0.68
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar 0.95 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.93
GJENSIDIGE Invest 1.00 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.94
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Fund βMKT βSMB βHML βPR1Y R adj − R2
Globus Aktiv 1.18 0.23 -0.21 -0.32 0.82
Globus Norge 1.16 0.28 -0.21 -0.35 0.84
Globus Norge II 1.17 0.25 -0.22 -0.33 0.81
Handelsbanken Norge 1.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.90
Handelsbanken Norge A10 1.04 -0.09 -0.08 0.18 0.90
Holberg Norge 1.00 0.24 -0.10 -0.10 0.84
K-IPA Aksjefond 0.97 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.85
KLP Aksjeinvest 0.95 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.90
KLP AksjeNorge 1.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.92
Landkreditt Norge 0.95 0.11 -0.01 -0.15 0.83
Landkreditt Utbytte 0.53 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.50
Landkreditt Utbytte I 0.53 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.60
NB-Aksjefond 1.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.16 0.92
Nordea Avkastning 0.96 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.83
Nordea Barnespar 0.98 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.92
Nordea Kapital 1.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.93
Nordea Kapital II 1.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 0.92
Nordea Kapital III 1.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 0.94
Nordea Norge Pluss 1.07 0.12 -0.08 0.03 0.84
Nordea Norge Verdi 0.94 0.16 -0.04 -0.12 0.86
Nordea SMB 1.10 0.52 -0.09 -0.15 0.83
Nordea SMB II 1.04 0.55 -0.13 -0.09 0.78
Nordea Vekst 1.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.91
ODIN Norge 1.00 0.29 0.06 -0.09 0.79
ODIN Norge A 0.81 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.77
ODIN Norge B 0.81 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.77
ODIN Norge D 0.81 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.77
ODIN Norge II 0.98 0.30 -0.05 -0.06 0.82
Orkla Finans 30 1.05 0.14 -0.05 -0.09 0.91
Pareto Aksje Norge 0.95 0.18 0.00 -0.04 0.84
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforval) 0.97 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 0.89
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv) 0.95 -0.11 -0.04 -0.07 0.94
Postbanken Aksjevekst 1.02 0.05 -0.18 -0.10 0.92
RF Aksjefond 0.96 0.02 -0.06 -0.13 0.92
RF-Plussfond 1.11 0.20 -0.30 -0.19 0.87
Sbanken Framgang Sammen 0.89 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.84
SEB Norge LU 1.07 0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.92
Skandia Horisont 1.05 0.21 -0.09 0.03 0.86
Skandia SMB Norge 1.05 0.43 -0.13 -0.12 0.82
SR-Bank Norge A 1.30 0.27 0.03 0.16 0.90
SR-Bank Norge B 1.30 0.27 0.03 0.16 0.90
Storebrand Aksje Innland 1.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.97
Storebrand AksjeSpar 0.65 0.06 -0.14 -0.10 0.72
Storebrand Norge 0.98 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.89
Storebrand Norge A 1.06 0.03 -0.13 -0.20 0.92
Storebrand Norge Fossilfri 0.47 -0.10 -0.11 0.03 0.55
Storebrand Norge I 1.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 0.94
Storebrand Norge Institusjon 0.98 0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.91
Storebrand Optima Norge 1.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.10 0.92
Storebrand Vekst 1.05 0.25 -0.40 -0.03 0.71
Storebrand Verdi 0.99 -0.05 0.11 0.01 0.94
Storebrand Verdi N 0.84 0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.93
Terra Norge 1.06 0.12 -0.16 -0.10 0.92
VÅR Aksjefond 1.11 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.90
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Appendix B
Figure B.I: This figure presents the Norwegian interbank offered rate (NIBOR) one month rate, used





















Table C.I: The table presents annualized alpha from four-factor model in percent for each individual
fund. Alpha estimates are displayed in column 1. In addition, parametric t-statistic and the cor-
responding parametric p-value is presented in the third and fourth column, respectvely. Lastly, the
bootstrapped p-value of the respective fund is presented in column 5.
Fund Alpha t-statistic Parametric p-value bootstrapped p-value
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 3.02 2.23 0.01 0.80
FIRST Norge Fokus 10.95 2.19 0.01 0.52
Landkreditt Utbytte 5.38 2.15 0.02 0.30
Fondsfinans Norge 3.78 1.94 0.03 0.34
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 3.26 1.94 0.03 0.17
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv) 1.95 1.83 0.03 0.16
Landkreditt Utbytte I 7.62 1.82 0.03 0.09
FORTE Trønder 6.18 1.43 0.08 0.56
Storebrand Norge I 1.60 1.36 0.09 0.58
Storebrand Norge Fossilfri 4.18 1.24 0.11 0.70
Storebrand Optima Norge 1.72 1.19 0.12 0.70
Landkreditt Norge 3.19 1.15 0.12 0.66
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1.78 1.15 0.13 0.56
DNB Norge R 6.11 1.11 0.13 0.52
Danske Invest Norge II 1.39 1.07 0.14 0.53
Storebrand Verdi N 2.32 1.02 0.15 0.55
Storebrand Verdi 1.13 0.99 0.16 0.52
Eika Norge 1.71 0.97 0.17 0.47
Pareto Aksje Norge 1.80 0.95 0.17 0.41
K-IPA Aksjefond 4.72 0.90 0.18 0.46
Nordea Norge Verdi 1.35 0.88 0.19 0.41
Alfred Berg Norge 1.37 0.85 0.20 0.41
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforval) 1.25 0.82 0.21 0.39
Nordea Kapital 0.93 0.81 0.21 0.34
Storebrand Norge 0.97 0.74 0.23 0.43
C WorldWide Norge 0.92 0.74 0.23 0.37
DNB SMB 1.91 0.71 0.24 0.36
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 1.30 0.66 0.26 0.43
Holberg Norge 1.15 0.59 0.28 0.55
ODIN Norge 1.07 0.55 0.29 0.59
Danske Invest Norge I 0.72 0.55 0.29 0.50
ODIN Norge A 1.55 0.54 0.29 0.44
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 0.58 0.50 0.31 0.48
ODIN Norge D 1.31 0.45 0.32 0.54
ODIN Norge B 1.28 0.45 0.33 0.49
VÅR Aksjefond 1.91 0.42 0.34 0.48
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0.23 0.30 0.38 0.79
Nordea Avkastning 0.48 0.29 0.38 0.74
ABIF Norge ++ 0.70 0.29 0.39 0.68
Alfred Berg Humanfond 0.31 0.21 0.42 0.82
DNB Norge (IV) 0.17 0.16 0.44 0.87
KLP AksjeNorge 0.21 0.15 0.44 0.85
Skandia Horisont 0.26 0.08 0.47 0.92
Handelsbanken Norge 0.08 0.06 0.48 0.92
Storebrand Vekst 0.06 0.02 0.49 0.93
Alfred Berg Norge + gml -0.01 -0.01 0.50 0.06
DNB Norge (I) -0.19 -0.07 0.47 0.03
DNB Norge (III) -0.06 -0.07 0.47 0.04
Storebrand AksjeSpar -0.20 -0.10 0.46 0.04
Delphi Norge -0.23 -0.12 0.45 0.04
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Fund Alpha t-statistic Parametric p-value Bootstrapped p-value
ODIN Norge II -0.39 -0.15 0.44 0.04
Alfred Berg Gambak -0.38 -0.19 0.42 0.02
Nordea Kapital II -0.71 -0.26 0.40 0.01
FORTE Norge -1.04 -0.33 0.37 0.00
Danske Invest Norge Vekst -0.74 -0.33 0.37 0.00
DnB Real-Vekst -2.30 -0.36 0.36 0.00
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) -0.38 -0.36 0.36 0.01
Nordea Norge Pluss -0.81 -0.38 0.35 0.01
Sbanken Framgang Sammen -1.01 -0.41 0.34 0.01
Banco Norge -2.11 -0.50 0.31 0.00
Eika SMB -1.23 -0.52 0.30 0.00
SEB Norge LU -1.68 -0.53 0.30 0.00
Storebrand Norge A -2.27 -0.56 0.29 0.00
Fondsfinans Aktiv II -2.49 -0.65 0.26 0.00
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk -1.23 -0.68 0.25 0.00
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class D -1.54 -0.69 0.25 0.00
Terra Norge -1.28 -0.69 0.24 0.00
Delphi Vekst -1.99 -0.74 0.23 0.00
DNB Norge (Avanse I) -1.00 -0.80 0.21 0.00
Handelsbanken Norge A10 -3.21 -0.84 0.20 0.00
NB-Aksjefond -1.36 -0.85 0.20 0.00
Atlas Norge -1.91 -0.91 0.18 0.00
FIRST Generator -3.58 -0.91 0.18 0.00
Alfred Berg Aktiv -1.71 -0.92 0.18 0.00
Alfred Berg Norge Classic -0.94 -0.93 0.18 0.00
Nordea Barnespar -3.02 -0.94 0.17 0.00
KLP Aksjeinvest -2.44 -0.97 0.17 0.00
SR-Bank Norge B -7.07 -1.05 0.15 0.00
SR-Bank Norge A -7.08 -1.05 0.15 0.00
Orkla Finans 30 -2.07 -1.06 0.14 0.00
RF Aksjefond -2.32 -1.09 0.14 0.00
Postbanken Aksjevekst -2.97 -1.17 0.12 0.00
Alfred Berg Aktiv II -2.93 -1.20 0.12 0.00
Globus Aktiv -6.13 -1.21 0.11 0.00
Nordea Kapital III -3.23 -1.24 0.11 0.00
Alfred Berg N. Pensjon -3.49 -1.24 0.11 0.00
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class A -2.92 -1.30 0.10 0.00
Nordea Vekst -1.77 -1.31 0.10 0.00
Storebrand Norge Institusjon -3.56 -1.33 0.09 0.00
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class I -2.86 -1.37 0.09 0.00
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class B -2.99 -1.42 0.08 0.00
RF-Plussfond -7.01 -1.43 0.08 0.01
DNB Norge -1.21 -1.44 0.07 0.02
DNB Norge (Avanse II) -1.72 -1.53 0.06 0.01
Fokus Barnespar -11.89 -1.67 0.05 0.00
Alfred Berg Vekst -8.95 -1.72 0.04 0.00
Globus Norge II -8.34 -1.73 0.04 0.01
GAMBAK Oppkjøp -18.62 -1.81 0.04 0.01
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesf. A -19.06 -1.89 0.03 0.01
Globus Norge -8.54 -1.99 0.02 0.01
Alfred Berg Aksjef Norge -3.32 -2.03 0.02 0.02
Alfred Berg Aksjespar -4.98 -2.14 0.02 0.02
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar -4.28 -2.45 0.01 0.01
Nordea SMB -6.44 -2.63 0.00 0.01
GJENSIDIGE Invest -5.31 -2.96 0.00 0.01
Nordea SMB II -16.93 -3.18 0.00 0.02
Skandia SMB Norge -12.25 -3.22 0.00 0.19
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Appendix D
Table D.I: This table presents bootstrapped p-values where the block length used in the bootstrapping
of residuals has been altered from the initial block length of 4 used for the main part of this thesis. Funds
are ranked on t-statistic of alpha, Bootstrapped- and parametric p-values of the funds are presented
in the following rows. Panel A displays results using a block length of 1, whereas panel B and C
presents results of applying a block length of 2 and 10 respectively. Columns 2-6 present findings for
top percentiles, bottom percentiles results are presented in columns 7-11.
Top Top Bottom Bottom
Top 2.nd 3.rd 5% 10% 10% 5% 3.rd 2.nd Bottom
Panel A: Block Length of 1
t-statistic 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.24 -1.81 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
Bootstrapped p 0.82 0.55 0.32 0.21 0.76 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.17
Parametric p 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Block Length of 2
t-statistic 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.24 -1.81 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
Bootstrapped p 0.81 0.53 0.32 0.2 0.73 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.18
Parametric p 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel c: Block Length of 10
t-statistic 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.24 -1.81 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
Bootstrapped p 0.78 0.48 0.25 0.14 0.61 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.18
Parametric p 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table D.II: This table presents bootstrapped p-values where the minimum number of observations in
order to be included in the sample has been altered. Panel A displays the baseline bootstrap used in
this thesis. Panels B-D results for when a minimum of 26, 36, and 60 is used in fund selection. Funds
are ranked on t-statistic of alpha, Bootstrapped- and parametric p-values of the funds are presented
in the following rows 2 and 3 for each panel. Columns 2-6 present findings for top percentiles, bottom
percentiles results are presented in columns 7-11.
Top Top Bottom Bottom
Top 2.nd 3.rd 5th 10th 10th 5th 3.rd 2.nd Bottom
Panel A: Baseline bootstrap, minimum 12 obs
t-statistic 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.19 -1.73 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
bootstrapped p-value 0.80 0.52 0.29 0.17 0.70 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.19
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Minimum 24 observations
t-statistic 2.23 2.15 1.94 1.83 1.15 -1.72 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
bootstrapped p 0.75 0.50 0.48 0.24 0.76 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.16
parametric p 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Minimum 36 observations
t-statistic 2.23 2.15 1.94 1.83 1.15 -1.72 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
Bootstrapped p 0.74 0.48 0.47 0.23 0.74 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.16
parametric p 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D: Minimum 60 observations
t-statistic 2.23 2.15 1.94 1.83 1.15 -1.72 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
bootstrapped p 0.70 0.43 0.40 0.16 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15
parametric p 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table D.III: This table presents bootstrapped p-values of portfolios of funds. The average t-statistic is
calculated for the top 1 to n funds, and compared to the average bootstrapped t-statistics for that same
number of top funds. The same procedure is used for the bottom funds. The average t-statistic of the
top 1 to n funds is given in row 1, and the corresponding bootstrapped p-value is presented in row 2.
Top Top Top Top Bottom Bottom Bottom Bottom
Top 2 3 5 10 10 5 3 2 Bottom
Average t 2.23 2.21 2.19 2.09 1.81 -2.43 -2.89 -3.12 -3.20 -3.22
Bootstrapped p 0.80 0.71 0.61 0.50 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.19
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Table D.IV: This table presents bootstrapped p-values of the Kosowski et al. (2006) method using a
block length of 4 for the sub-periods investigated in this thesis. Funds are ranked on parametric t-
statistic of alpha in all panels. Panel A present the bootstrap results of the period as a whole. Panel
B to panel E present bootstrap results for each sub period respectively. Each panel present parametric
t-statistic, bootstrapped p-value and parametric p-value in row 1-3 respectively. Top fund results is
presented in column 2-6 in descending order respectively. Results for bottom performers is shown in
the 7 to 11 column, where column 6 present the bottom 10th percentile and column 11 present results
of the bottom performer.
Top 2.nd 3.rd 5% 10% 10% 5% 3.rd 2.nd Bottom
Panel A:Fund Ranked on Four-Factor Alpha t-statistic, full period (1987 - 2019)
t-alpha 2.23 2.19 2.15 1.94 1.24 -1.81 -2.45 -2.96 -3.18 -3.22
Bootstrapped p 0.80 0.52 0.30 0.17 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.19
parametric p 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:Funds Ranked on Four-Factor Alpha t-statistic (1987 Q1 - 1995 Q1)
t-alpha 1.57 1.02 0.46 0.06 -0.70 -1.08 -1.31 -3.12 -3.16 -3.28
Bootstrapped p 0.66 0.77 0.97 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.23
Parametric p 0.06 0.15 0.32 0.48 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C:Funds Ranked on Four-Factor Alpha t-statistic (1995 Q2 - 2003 Q2)
t-alpha 2.46 1.20 1.19 1.08 0.28 -2.12 -2.64 -3.16 -3.18 -4.03
Bootstrapped p 0.34 0.99 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Parametric p 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.39 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D:Funds Ranked on Four-Factor Alpha t-statistic (2003 Q3 - 2011 Q3)
t-alpha 1.91 1.77 1.64 1.40 1.13 -1.33 -1.89 -2.44 -2.84 -3.12
Bootstrapped p 0.90 0.80 0.73 0.70 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Parametric p 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Panel B:Funds Ranked on Four-Factor Alpha t-statistic (2011 Q4 - 2019 Q4)
t-alpha 2.19 2.15 1.82 1.55 1.02 0.93 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.60
Bootstrapped p 0.73 0.41 0.53 0.51 0.74 0.68 0.94 0.84 0.76 0.69
Parametric p 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27
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Kristian Fjærbu Løhaugen Vikstøl 
The topic of the thesis ''Are Active Norwegian Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Luck or Skill", utilizes 
the method of Kosowski, Timmermann, White, and Wermers (2006) and Fama and French (2010) in 
the investigation of skill or luck amongst the Norwegian mutual fund managers. Further, Harvey and 
Liu (2020) proposed a new approach in this sphere, also applying the bootstrapping methodology. 
Bootstrapping methodology is key in the research conducted, in both skill and multiple test 
correction used in the thesis. The subject of whether mutual fund managers are skillful is heavily 
studied abroad. 
The thesis examines a total of 107 Norwegian mutual funds, in the period extending from 1987 to 
2019. In the sample, both the funds still open up to 2019, and the funds that have closed before this 
are included in the sample. The null hypothesis states that there is no true performance, meaning 
that mutual fund managers are not able to generate significant outperformance nor 
underperformance in relation to the risk factors. Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) 
method is replicated, as these two methods are highly recognized in distinguishing luck from skill 
amongst mutual fund managers, generating p-values or, equivalently, likelihoods as to whether the 
manager is in possession of skill. Through the application, we find no evidence of skill amongst the 
mutual fund managers at a 5% significance level. 
However, there is evidence of having a lack of skill amongst the worst performers in Norwegian 
mutual funds. These findings are in line with the findings of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and 
French (2010) as they also found significant evidence of a lack of skill. Fama and French, however, 
found little evidence of skill amongst the managers, where Kosowski et al. (2006) found skill. From 
the investigation applying the method of Harvey and Liu (2020) we did not find evidence of out- or 
underperformance. That said, applying their method is relying on the signal to noise in the data, 
where a low signal to noise could result in the findings being less relevant. 
In relation to the concept “international” it is clear that the methods applied are readily adopted by 
researchers around the world. Both the methods proposed by Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and 
French (2010) has been applied by multiple researchers. In addition, the statistical method of 
bootstrapping, is also recognized as a well-functioning statistical method. The funds under 
investigation are comprised of Norwegian stocks, in addition, they are required to always hold at 
least 80\% Norwegian equities. These funds thus operate mainly in Norway, however, they are 
definitely exposed to international trends. Stocks listed on the Oslo Stock exchange are to a large 
degree internationally affected both in terms of international investors buying and selling the stock, 
in addition to relations to countries abroad. The international trend of sustainability is hitting the 
financial market of Norway too. ESG investing introduces constraints on the stocks available for the 
funds following the ESG standards. This is not necessarily a constraint which imposes a problem for 
mutual fund managers in generating positive net returns for their investors. That is, international and 
national institutions are contributing to ESG investing through different channels, making the 
investments more attractive for funds and investors.  
Funds are required to take action on these trends if they are to generate value for their investors as 
companies aimed at creating a sustainable future have generated high returns in the past. Being part 
of an international financial world also warrants the funds to follow international requirements for 
financial services. With MiFID II introduced, funds are required to act accordingly in order to be 
recognized as a responsible financial actor. 
In addition, the thesis investigates mutual fund performance both on individual and aggregate levels 
through factor models. These models have been applied to a large degree in international studies 
since the inception in 1968 where Jensen proposed a single factor model, measuring the abnormal 
performance of a funds through its alpha (Jensen, 1968). Further, Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997) extended the single factor model by additional risk factors taking into consideration 
market anomalies.  
These factor models have been presented to me at multiple occasions throughout the financial 
master program. Both in statistical analysis and in subjects concerning financial theory and portfolio 
management. I find that these models contribute to the understanding of how the financial markets 
work, and point to important aspects of the financial markets.  
Through the use of factor model’s researchers have struggled to warrant the use of active mutual 
fund management as opposed to investing in passive index funds. Several Scandinavian studies 
conclude that the mutual fund managers are not able to do much more than collect fees paid by 
investors (Christensen, 2003; Flam and Vestman, 2017; Korkemaki and Smythe Jr, 2004). There 
seems, however, to be multiple findings of active managers which are able to generate positive net-
of-fees returns for their investors. The main issue here, is that these are relatively few in comparison 
with active managers which actually underperform in relation to their benchmark.  
In relation to international research, investigators, as mentioned, are struggling to find evidence as to 
warrant the use of active mutual funds. Despite this fact, we see, as depicted in the thesis, that the 
assets under management for Norwegian mutual funds have been growing throughout the years 
after 2000. This points to a disagreement between researchers and mutual fund investors. 
Researchers suggest that active investment is not worthwhile, whereas investors believe that active 
investment adds value. There are many possible explanations as to account for this difference in 
beliefs, and a discussion around this would be outside the scope of the discussion paper. It is worth 
noting, however, that there seems to be a disagreement between these two groups. 
There has also been a trend towards the use of cheap index funds as an alternative to actively 
managed funds. Index funds are supposed to follow the index of some sector, stock exchange, or the 
likes. Here, researchers and investors are in agreement. Researchers have argued that any attempt to 
''beat the market" is a foolish attempt (Fama, 1970). One aspect of this discussion which I have 
struggled to find, is the viewpoint where if you invest in a passively managed index fund, you are 
guaranteed to lose against the market when fees are deducted. Although these fees are low in 
relation to the fees collected by active mutual funds, they are still guaranteeing loss if the passive 
index is indeed able to replicate the returns of the given index it is supposed to follow. 
Fama and French (2010) also argues that if any fund is able to beat the market, they do so with a 
negative impact on another fund, that is, in sum, the funds do not beat the market. This argument 
expresses the need for investors to not pick funds at will, but search for funds that may outperform 
in relation to others. We also see from the cumulative returns in the thesis that an equally weighted 
portfolio of funds that are still open as of December 2019 has a higher cumulative return than that of 
the benchmark and funds that have been closed throughout the sample. The returns have not been 
tested for significance, but we do however note this difference.  
There has also been a debate amongst researchers internationally as to what benchmark one should 
use in the evaluation of mutual funds. In an ideal world, one would apply the market portfolio from 
CAPM, however, such a portfolio is not readily available and one needs to use a proxy instead. From 
the discussions of multiple researchers, one should use a broad index, which is suited to represent a 
benchmark for the active funds at hand. That is, in order to evaluate fund performance in line with 
the consensus with international research standards on the topic, one cannot make use of one 
benchmark for all studies. Meaning that if we are investigating mutual funds in Norway, we have to 
incorporate a benchmark which represent the market where the Norwegian mutual funds invest. We 
also here have to take into consideration the stocks which are available to the funds. If we are 
investigating funds which have the opportunity to buy small and risky stocks, these should also be 
represented in the benchmark used for comparison. A point made by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996) 
in their critique of Ippolito (1989). 
Through the use of Harvey and Liu (2020) approach, published in one of the forefront financial 
journals, we might be in the early stages of an up and coming statistical method for evaluating funds, 
financial assets, and financial strategies. Taking into consideration the statistical power of tests is 
important, yet, many papers fail to consider this. When Harvey and Liu evaluated the approach 
applied by Fama and French (2010), they found that the Type II error rate of the test was too high, 
resulting in low test power. From this, the tests used to evaluate skill in funds might have to be 
adjusted in order to generate a high enough statistical power to be certain in inferences. 
In the past few years, statistical power has been up and coming in the discussion amongst 
researchers (Harvey and Liu, 2020). Statistical power is of great importance, as inferences may be 
misleading if the results of the study are affected by the Type I error rate and Type II error rate of the 
test conducted. The significance of error rates was presented already at the first statistics course. 
This affects the degree of which we can rely on the findings. Harvey and Liu (2020) argued in their 
paper that the focus have, in too large a degree, been on generating statistically significant evidence, 
in order to be published.  
From this, I conclude that the active mutual fund managers, and the methods used are definitely 
internationally orientated. The Norwegian mutual fund managers invest in stocks that are not in a 
closed environment, as such, managers need to pay attention to international trends. In addition, 
they are also not the only ones who have the ability to invest in these funds. The methods has been 
applied by several researchers, in different parts of the world. As to the findings of the thesis, the 
investigation leads us to say that we find evidence of unskilled managers. From this, we can say that 
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